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Polynesia in Review: Issues and Events, 1 July 1995 to 30 June 1996Reviews of American Samoa, Hawai‘i, 
Tuvalu, and Wallis and Futuna are not 
included in this issue.
The Cook Islands
When the Cook Islands Party came 
into power in 1989, it had the roads 
repaired, the port improved, telecom-
munications upgraded, the power sys-
tem expanded, and took other steps to 
improve the national infrastructure. 
That phase did not last. The govern-
ment’s financial house of cards came 
tumbling down amid revelations of 
scandalous financial management 
facilitated by lying, deception, fraud, 
and misappropriation.
Earned sources of national income 
soared through the 1980s. Tourism, 
the largest industry, grew faster than in 
most of the region. Cultured pearls 
and sashimi tuna were harvested for 
the first time and flown to the United 
States and Japan. The international 
finance center (tax haven) grew with 
increased use by Asian investors. There 
was more demand for Cook Islands 
fruits and vegetables in New Zealand 
and Hawai‘i than farmers could sup-
ply. The growth in income appeared to 
continue from the late 1980s, but it 
was a chimera, based on ill-conceived 
borrowing and extravagant waste.
For the first time ever, significant 
numbers of people expressed shame to 
be Cook Islanders—always because of 
the actions of political leaders. What 
had the leaders done? The largest sin-
gle cause of failure was the enormous 
number of persons paid by the govern-
ment. A big increase in “jobs” (that is, 218paid posts, most not involving any sig-
nificant work) occurred just before the 
1994 election to ensure reelection of 
the Cook Islands Party. With the gov-
ernment employing 3400 directly (and 
others indirectly), and the government 
controlling contracts, purchase of sup-
plies, and so on, probably more than 
95 percent of the 3700 households in 
the nation depended on government 
funds.
Even so, the Cook Islands Party 
won only 52 percent of the vote. They 
got 20 of the 25 seats because the 
opposition was split, disorganized, and 
poorly led, but party leaders could see 
that a moderately organized opposi-
tion could topple them. Since their pri-
mary interest was power rather than 
public service, the political leaders set 
out to buy public support at any cost. 
This tendency is not unusual in “dem-
ocratic” politics, but the concentration 
of government power is unusual, as 
was the extent to which leaders were 
prepared to throw the nation into 
chaos, and their people into poverty, in 
the attempt to retain power and privi-
leges.
Government departments were 
allotted funds for salaries, but the 
main reason for employing new staff 
was political allegiance, not work. 
Thus mechanics, carpenters, and oth-
ers at the Ministry of Works spent 
months playing cards, chatting, or 
returning home after signing on as 
present, for there were no funds for 
fuel or parts for vehicles, or materials 
for construction.
Ministers and senior officials were 
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financial secretary admitted that if the 
trust on which their use was based was 
abused, little could be done. The trust 
was abused. Little was done.
The second approach to political 
survival was borrowing. After govern-
ment assurances that debt was not 
serious, but the amount was “confi-
dential,” the extent was revealed after 
pressure from the Asian Development 
Bank and the New Zealand Govern-
ment, which had been asked to provide 
a rescue package. With a gross domes-
tic product of about nz$150 million, 
bankers would consider $5 million (3 
percent to 5 percent) of government 
debt to be reasonable. In fact, govern-
ment debt is $169 million, 113 percent 
of gross domestic product.
The largest debt is nz$113 million 
for the government-owned, Mafia-
linked hotel at Vaimaanga on Raro-
tonga. Eight years after the contract 
was signed, the hotel remains empty. 
Rent on the land is paid by the govern-
ment, but the land is used by a minister 
growing private crops for export. The 
heads of icle Bank, which provided 
the loan, and sace Insurance, which 
guaranteed it, were jailed in Italy. 
Large sums were released to the con-
tractor (also since jailed) by the Cook 
Islands Government before the work 
was done. The reason for this has 
never been adequately explained, but a 
Cook Islands businesswoman quoted a 
New Zealand official as saying that the 
money hides in the Caribbean (Press, 
26 Apr 1996).
In addition to other overseas debts 
on which the government has 
defaulted (including to the government 
of Nauru, which sent a delegation, unsuccessfully, to retrieve their funds), 
$5 million is owed to local banks, 
which will lend no more. Worst of all, 
$10 million is owed in “trustee liabili-
ties,” Cook Islanders’ funds—includ-
ing their savings in the government 
savings bank, their pension funds, and 
the workers’ compensation reserve.
Also raided was Te Aponga Uira 
(the electricity utility), which is nomi-
nally autonomous and self-funding. 
Tariffs include funds for capital 
replacements, but in practice equip-
ment has almost always been allowed 
to run down until a crisis was reached. 
France supplied a concessionary loan 
for new generators on condition that 
income would provide for mainte-
nance and replacement, but the gov-
ernment raided the capital reserve.
Likewise, the Airport Authority was 
to be autonomous and pay its way 
through landing fees and other income. 
Then the government changed the law 
to make the income payable to the 
government, which would allocate 
“enough” to run the airport. As a 
result, maintenance has been mini-
mized. The runway is sinking because 
the drainage system is not being ade-
quately maintained. If it deteriorates 
much further, international pilots may 
refuse to use it. In the meantime,
the minister to whom the authority 
reports takes its funds for his travel 
and other expenses. The Ports Author-
ity “granted” $100,000 to the gov-
ernment, and Telecom gave the 
government an advance on its 
dividend.
A third cause was other government 
spending, including increasing pen-
sions, destitute, infirm, and child 
allowances before Christmas 1995, 
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popularity and dampen demands for 
wage increases. New government insti-
tutions kept springing up, ostensibly to 
“serve the public,” but usually the 
stronger motive was to strengthen the 
political power base. The 1995 Raro-
tonga telephone book lists 79 “Gov-
ernment Departments and Agencies,” 
not including enterprises like Telecom 
Cook Islands or The Cook Islands 
National Line (shipping), in both of 
which the government is a major 
shareholder.
A fourth cause was inefficient reve-
nue collection. Many were officially or 
unofficially “excused” from payment 
of customs duties, turnover taxes, and 
other dues.
Fifth were the many ways of 
siphoning off what would otherwise be 
government revenue. Thus the Health 
Board asked its minister, Dr Joseph 
Williams, in one of his other capacities 
as minister in charge of the govern-
ment liquor monopoly, to put a levy on 
beer to help the hospital provide basic 
services. The minister rejected that 
proposal but arranged for a surcharge 
on beer to go to a “sports and cultural 
foundation,” in which he personally 
owns 99 percent of the shares (Press, 
17 Mar 1996). How much was col-
lected we do not know, but the only 
known beneficiary is the son of his 
friend, relative, and fellow minister 
Tom Marsters. The son was awarded 
a$28,000 to study golf in Australia, 
although the award is now in abeyance 
following a public outcry. The public 
was not informed of the fund nor 
invited to apply. Nor was the academy 
in Australia told that the candidate 
had been banned from the Rarotonga Golf Club for viciously assaulting the 
manager.
Theft of public money is facilitated 
by relaxed official attitudes. The minis-
ter for the Public Service explained in a 
long interview on national television 
(19 Jan 1996) that, although theft by 
public servants was common through-
out the Cook Islands, he was not 
greatly concerned and did not blame 
those who stole, as many had big fami-
lies, and some of the money stolen was 
probably used to help others. Asked by 
the Cook Islands interviewer what 
should be done, the minister said we 
must be patient! Exceedingly little is 
done. Even the $10,000 stolen within 
police headquarters remains 
“unsolved.”
Given such views at the top, and 
similar views and practices more 
widely, it is not surprising that govern-
ment resources are extensively used for 
the private benefit of those with 
power. Little is done to control the 
practice, partly because many do not 
regard abuse of public office as abuse 
of the public—who ultimately pay for 
it—partly because many families are 
directly or indirectly implicated.
How can politicians get away with 
such gross inefficiencies? A major fac-
tor is that many people are compro-
mised. Almost every household 
depends on government employment 
or contracts; government workers are 
allowed informal time off; churches 
are bribed with free equipment, labor, 
and materials; extras are available to 
the politically faithful. Government 
workers repair selected private homes, 
cut hedges, plow fields, feed pigs, and 
“lend” materials and equipment as 
political payoffs in tiny electorates. 
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added, especially at election times.
Another cause of decline was the 
collapse in the value of agricultural 
exports from nz$1.8 million in 1989 
(the year the present government came 
to power) to nz$500,000 in 1995. The 
decline was caused by many leaving 
agricultural work to take up govern-
ment “jobs” involving, not work, but 
political support. Income and effort 
were increasingly disassociated.
Tourist numbers fell in 1995 and 
further in 1996, in part because inter-
national publicity about corruption 
and poor governance discouraged 
tourists and tourism investors, and 
because the government’s up-market 
hotel never opened. The government’s 
three operating hotels were poorly 
managed. Polynesian Airlines reduced 
its flights to Samoa, Fiji, and Australia 
from two a week to one, then to none, 
because of light loads. Kiwi Air prom-
ised a regular service from New 
Zealand from June 1996, but with-
drew when they were not properly 
paid for charters to Rarotonga over 
Christmas. The charter group’s key 
“owner” was on the government pay-
roll as a “consultant” to Dr Joseph 
Williams, who is also minister of civil 
aviation, after a long association not 
only with the minister (whose election 
campaign he managed), but also with 
the police, having been convicted in 
New Zealand for theft (ten times in 
one year alone), fraud (on four occa-
sions), forgery, bad debts, misrepresen-
tation, and other interesting activities. 
Another former minister who was also 
on the government payroll absconded 
to Australia where he is being sought 
by those whose money he was “look-ing after.” Once Kiwi Air understood 
who it was dealing with, it withdrew. 
Air Rarotonga, the only remaining 
interisland airline, reduced flights to 
the main outer islands (except the 
tourist destination of Aitutaki) from 
five a week to two.
Rents and house prices fell to less 
than half their 1994 levels. More 
homes were advertised for rent or sale 
than ever before, and many were sim-
ply locked up and abandoned. Eddie 
Karika, probably the largest renter of 
homes, said half of his properties were 
vacant, and one tenant owed over 
$2,000 in back rent.
A team from the Asian Develop-
ment Bank, supplied as a condition
of assistance, held discussions with 
officials and the private sector and 
produced a remedial formula. The 
government accepted most of it in 
principle, but implemented less in 
practice. The prime minister agreed 
with the bank’s assessment that the 
“public service” should be cut from 
3400 to 1200 and promised to do that 
over three years. He has promised for 
years to reduce the government pay-
roll, but always increased it in practice. 
New Zealand is resisting subsidizing 
public service positions, as it uses only 
180 government employees per 18,000 
people (the population of the Cook 
Islands), and because many services are 
provided free by visiting specialists (eg, 
medical specialists fly in regularly on 
aid programs).
By June 1996 no one had been dis-
missed, although many who saw that 
the government had no money to pay 
them resigned and emigrated. The 
prime minister wanted to act, but resis-
tance in cabinet was strong. Only 
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as the complete exhaustion of all 
funds, including those obtained by 
begging, borrowing, misrepresenta-
tion, misappropriation, and other 
means). They had not quite reached 
the limit at the time of writing—but 
almost!
From March 1996 the pay of all 
government workers was cut by 15 
percent. For May and June it was 
reduced by a further 50 percent, with a 
verbal promise by the prime minister 
that the remaining 50 percent would 
be paid over the following two years. 
Public opinion on talk-back radio, 
letters to the editor, and in conversa-
tions, was that it would not happen. 
Few government promises have been 
honored for some time. The 50 percent 
cut did not apply to persons on the 
legal minimum wage of nz$2.80 per 
hour (which is double the average min-
imum wage in independent Pacific 
Island nations). The cabinet cut their 
own real income much less than they 
cut everyone else’s, leaving themselves 
more privileged than ever relative to 
the national average.
The public service union is suing the 
government for their full pay. An anti-
government demonstration in March 
was the first since 1978 (when it was 
against the government of Albert 
Henry, a cousin of the present prime 
minister, who had defrauded the public 
of massive funds to finance his elec-
tion). Teachers held a one-week strike 
in May. Other public servants did not 
strike, but little work was done, and 
many took time off on full pay. The 
civil service is at its lowest ebb of effec-
tiveness.
Not that effectiveness has been a strong point for some time. With pres-
sure building about the nonarrival of 
promised pay raises, delayed pay-
ments, and other constraints, despite 
rising living costs, paid holidays are a 
consolation prize. In just over a month 
we had Gospel Day to celebrate the 
arrival of Christianity in 1823; an 
early day on full pay for civil servants 
to join the Greenpeace demonstration 
against French bomb tests (many sim-
ply went home on full pay); then Float 
Parade Day, and two full days and 
three half-days (which many took as 
full days!) for the annual Constitution 
“Day”; another half-day (again full for 
most) to celebrate VJ day, even though 
Cook Islanders were not involved in 
the victory over Japan; then a half-day 
for those farewelling the canoe to pro-
test at Moruroa (again many neither 
worked nor farewelled, but were paid); 
and a full day for all civil servants to 
celebrate the centenary of Tereora Col-
lege.
The four government-owned hotels 
will be sold. All have been disasters for 
taxpayers, but bonanzas for politically 
linked persons who received fees, food, 
accommodation, jobs, and other per-
quisites. The government printing 
works, radio, and television station are 
being privatized. The government is 
reluctant to relinquish its monopoly on 
liquor imports despite (or because of?) 
massive corruption proven and even 
more alleged.
The high commission in Canberra 
and the consulate in Sydney closed in 
June. The high commissioner’s post 
was created for him, a former politi-
cian who left the opposition and 
enabled the Cook Islands Party to 
form a government in 1989. He 
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given a unique five-year contract, with 
unprecedented levels of pay and per-
quisites. In addition, he received the 
option of renewing for five years, or 
one million dollars cash. Many have 
speculated on the origin of such lever-
age. With the high commission closed, 
he is suing for compensation. Consular 
services in Auckland, Hawai‘i, and Los 
Angeles were reduced. Only the high 
commission in Wellington retained its 
previous size.
Personal income kept shrinking. In 
contrast to the high annual increases 
throughout the 1980s (averaging over 
6 percent per year), average gross 
domestic product at 1990 prices 
declined by 0.3 percent in 1991, 1.9 
percent in 1992, 6 percent in 1993, 0.5 
percent in 1994, and 7 percent in 1995 
(CIN, 2 May 1996). A much larger 
decrease is expected in 1996, which is 
likely to give a cumulative loss in gross 
domestic product per capita of at least 
25 percent since the Cook Islands 
Party gained power in 1989.
All department head positions were 
advertised, and new appointees were 
announced in June. An independent 
committee submitted a list for each 
post, but cabinet made the final deci-
sions. Most were selected from the 
lists, but not all. For example, the com-
mittee did not consider the prime min-
ister’s brother-in-law appointable as 
secretary for education, but he was 
appointed by cabinet. The public ser-
vice remains politicized.
New Zealand and Australian tax-
payers will pay, reluctantly, for the 
Cook Islands government’s failures. 
Either those governments help the eco-
nomic recovery, and thereby encourage Cook Islanders to stay home, or the 
Islanders will exercise their right as 
citizens of New Zealand and settle 
there or in Australia. (New Zealand 
citizens have free access to Australia 
and vice versa—but neither have free 
access to the Cook Islands). As Cook 
Islanders became more aware of the 
problems the government had created 
for them, and saw little hope in the 
alternative party, the departure rate of 
Cook Islanders trebled. In the seven 
years 1987 to 1993 an average of 1387 
more persons per year went abroad 
than came back. The figure was 4452 
in 1995, and 2041 in the first half of 
1996. In the past eighteen months 36 
percent of the national population left. 
The rate is accelerating. Few govern-
ments in the world have seen such a 
massive vote of no confidence.
Many headed for Australia, where 
pay is higher than in New Zealand. 
Dole rates for nonworkers were higher 
too, until Australia announced in April 
that new arrivals from anywhere must 
wait two years before receiving the 
dole. Those seeking work still find 
Australia attractive. Those not anxious 
to work opt for the dole in New 
Zealand. Many are in categories for 
which there is little work in New 
Zealand, but social security benefits 
there give a higher income than many 
would earn even if working in the 
Cook Islands. (Only 42 percent of 
Cook Islanders of working age in
New Zealand in 1991 were in full- or 
part-time work). Two categories of 
people cannot escape—those with 
unpaid taxes (as one needs a tax 
clearance to leave), and those who can-
not raise the very high fare. Persons 
with close blood or political connec-
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to leave.
The calculated corruption of the 
churches by the ruling party paid off 
for both. As Alatas (1968) has shown, 
corruption does not thrive where polit-
ical leaders set an honest example, or 
where religious leaders oppose and 
expose corruption. Cook Islanders are 
avid churchgoers, and church leaders 
wield considerable power, so a priority 
for politicians is to co-opt and corrupt 
the churches. It is surprisingly easy. 
When any religious organization 
builds a church, Sunday school, or 
other project, the government provides 
workers (paid by the government), 
equipment, and sometimes material 
and cash. In Avarua village, for exam-
ple, the Catholic Cathedral was built 
in 1994 by the Ministry of Works; the 
Cook Islands Christian Church was 
rebuilt in 1995 mainly by government 
staff; and a new Seventh-Day Adven-
tist church was built in 1996 by gov-
ernment workers. The same applies 
throughout the nation. No cash is paid 
for the government services. The 
understood price is collusion.
The action is politically popular 
because much government revenue 
comes from foreign aid or outsider-
owned businesses paying import 
duties, turnover tax, income tax, and 
other fees (among the largest are Air 
New Zealand and the banks). Politi-
cians “launder” it by calling it “help to 
the people” rather than its more 
important purpose of buying social, 
psychological, and political credits for 
the politicians—to whom obeisance is 
made.
Even when official lies, misappro-
priation, and maladministration were proven, the churches avoided such 
issues and concentrated on trivia. By 
March 1996 there were strident public 
calls for the prime minister and cabinet 
to step down. However, most churches 
rallied to the government’s aid. The 
Apostolic Church, whose national and 
Pacific headquarters in Rarotonga 
absorbed government labor, equip-
ment, and other assistance, and whose 
national leader is particularly culti-
vated by the government (and vice 
versa), led the charge. Apostolics 
financed newspaper and radio adver-
tisements, held public prayer meetings 
at the national cultural center, and 
reminded people of the help they had 
received from “the government”; now 
it was their turn to help “the govern-
ment.” In its running program of assis-
tance, one advertisement called on 
everyone to fast for half of each day 
for a week and “pray seven nights 
without ceasing and on the seventh 
night the church must have a joyful 
victory service with dancing and prais-
ing the Lord for the restoration of the 
country’s economy. . . . Let there be 
singing in every home, on the way to 
work, at the employment place” (CIN, 
27 Apr 1996).
The Religious Advisory Council (of 
the major churches) called a national 
day of prayer. It began on Saturday 23 
March with the Seventh-Day Adven-
tists (whose biggest project ever was 
being built by taxpayers). The other 
churches continued on Sunday. The 
emphasis in the council’s national tele-
vision broadcast was that no one must 
judge others (ie, the government) lest 
they themselves be judged; that the 
nation’s difficulties were caused by 
God “testing” the people as He had 
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sins and strengthen our faith as the 
current problems were caused by our 
lack of religious conviction.
A combined churches “March for 
Jesus” in May asked Jesus in return to 
“alleviate our economic and other 
woes.” Collections taken at two prayer 
services “for the nation” at the Civic 
Centre were paid to the prime minister 
by Bishop Pere of the Apostolic 
Church. His covering letter, which he 
published, noted that divine healing 
and deliverance would not come until 
the people of the world were stunned, 
baffled, and astounded, and asked 
themselves how it was done. The 
answer, said Bishop Pere to the prime 
minister, confirmed what the prime 
minister had told the nation: “If God 
be for us, who can be against us?” 
(CIN, 30 May 1996).
Many expressed disappointment in 
Prime Minister Sir Geoffrey Henry, but 
few had confidence in other leading 
politicians. Mr Tom Marsters and Dr 
Joseph Williams, the two cabinet min-
isters most often named as competitors 
for the post, have track records that 
disturb many voters.
The opposition was split among the 
Democratic Party (with 2 seats in par-
liament) and the Alliance Party (with 
3) to the ruling Cook Islands Party’s 20 
(but only 52 percent of the votes). The 
Alliance was a breakaway party 
formed in 1988 after disputes over 
leadership among the Democrats in 
1988. The Democratic Party leader, Dr 
Terepai Maoate, is a respected doctor, 
businessman, and community leader, 
but does not have the charisma to 
attract a national vote. The Alliance 
leader, Mr Norman George, has cha-risma, energy, and ambition, but a 
track record that includes numerous 
failed enterprises, massive debts, and 
alarming misuse of other people’s 
money. When in Cabinet in the 1980s 
he was the architect of the hotel deal 
with a Mafia-linked Italian construc-
tion company mentioned earlier. These 
and other activities make voters cau-
tious.
The parties fought bitterly until 
February 1996, when they negotiated 
a “Democratic Alliance.” Mr George 
was elected leader of the Alliance
in a national meeting of the two
parties with only 82 paid-up members 
present, indicating the extent of public 
support.
One Rarotongan member of parlia-
ment died in April. In a national first, 
both parties put up women candidates. 
The Cook Islands Party promoted Tina 
Pupuke Browne, a prominent lawyer 
and former president of the national 
netball association. The Democratic 
Alliance presented Aunty Mau (as she 
is universally known), who owns a 
small shop and is an active planter and 
vigorous community worker. Both 
were excellent choices, but few voters 
were happy about the parties they 
stood for.
At the last election the Cook Islands 
Party’s candidate won comfortably. At 
this one, however, the Democratic Alli-
ance candidate won 69 percent to the 
Cook Islands Party’s 31 percent. This 
was the more surprising because those 
who emigrated because of dissatisfac-
tion with the government would also 
have voted against it.
The “Wine Box” Commission of 
Inquiry in New Zealand continued 
during 1995–96. The inquiry is into 
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panies and Cook Islands officials 
revealed in a wine-box full of docu-
ments, copied clandestinely from Euro-
pean Pacific Bank (a tax haven) in the 
Cook Islands. Mr Trevor Clarke, who 
then headed European Pacific in Raro-
tonga, is now the prime minister’s 
international finance adviser. The New 
Zealand auditor general at the time 
described the Cook Islands Govern-
ment as engaging with New Zealand 
companies in “fraud of very consider-
able magnitude.” Recent Appeal Court 
cases revealed how Cook Islands tax 
haven banks protect international 
fraudsters.
Explaining why the Cook Islands 
would not cooperate with New 
Zealand’s judicial inquiry, the prime 
minister said that following one disclo-
sure 150 companies (out of 3065) 
immediately withdrew from the inter-
national finance center, causing a loss 
of government revenue. But accurate 
information is difficult to obtain. It is a 
crime to even mention any fact about 
the tax haven in the Cook Islands. 
When parliament discusses such issues, 
it is closed to the public, broadcasts 
are stopped, the records do not appear 
in Hansard, and the legislation is 
secret.
A signatory of controversial “Wine 
Box” documents was Peter Brannigan, 
who helped create some of the “strate-
gies” being investigated. In 1995 he 
was appointed by the Cook Islands 
Government as its senior auditor.
Press freedom was again an issue 
during the year. The prime minister 
still banned from his press conferences 
the Cook Islands Press, which had 
exposed the Letters of Guarantee and other scams the government had 
denied existed. Only the government-
owned radio and television, the gov-
ernment public relations officer, and 
the Cook Islands News (whose main 
owners were on revocable work per-
mits) were allowed. After the govern-
ment threatened to legislate press 
control, the media set up an indepen-
dent Cook Islands Media Council 
comprising a retired judge and three 
senior citizens.
The Cook Islands is too small to 
interest outside media except for spec-
tacular events, but late in 1995 the 
government required all media (and 
business people) to have special visas. 
Ian Wishart’s book The Paradise Con-
spiracy about fraud, deception, and 
misrepresentation in the Cook Islands 
“international finance centre” is a 
best-seller overseas, but no shop in the 
Cook Islands dares to stock it. Copies 
circulate privately.
In an effort to overcome land prob-
lems, a Land Commission was set up 
late in 1995. It reported in March 
1996. Recommendations included 
shortening the maximum lease from 
sixty to thirty years, turning the moun-
tainous center of Rarotonga into a 
national park, stricter requirements on 
usage in order to retain title, banning 
lawyers from the land court in most 
cases, replacing overseas judges by 
Cook Islanders, and steps to reduce the 
present extreme fragmentation of 
title—it is not unusual for a quarter-
acre house-site to have hundreds of 
joint owners. The government is 
expected to act on the report shortly.
On a lighter note, the government-
financed canoe Te Au o Tonga “sailed” 
(more accurately, once out of sight of 
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by a government ship) to Moruroa to 
protest the French bomb tests. It was a 
very successful public relations exer-
cise, as when it arrived at Moruroa, 
international media focused on it as 
the only canoe in a flotilla of yachts 
and motorboats. It remained for a day 
before sailing home. The tests were 
condemned in the Cook Islands, but 
the government’s disapproval was low-
key because of past favors from France, 
which had indicated that after the tests 
its aid to the Pacific would increase, 
especially to countries that did not 
cause too much bother during the tests.
The Cook Islands has slowly 
expanded its diplomatic ties. Beginning 
with New Zealand and Australia and 
other South Pacific Forum nations,
it later added the United Kingdom, 
Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, 
China, South Korea, Malaysia, the 
United States, and Canada to the list. 
This year it added South Africa, Portu-
gal, and Iran, with others “in the pipe-
line.” The intended political highlight 
of the year—joining the United 
Nations—was not pursued, not even 
publicly announced, as the funds 
needed for UN membership and repre-
sentation were exhausted.
It was a year of excitement and dis-
illusionment, and for many who left or 
wanted to but couldn’t, of despair. The 
constitution remains a constraint, for it 
ties political power to tiny electorates 
in which the temptation to buy each 
vote individually is extreme. There is 
no national electorate. And some 
entrenched corruption and abuse of 
power will not be easy to eradicate. 
Yet there were rays of inspiration. We 
hope that the current restructuring will leave the Cook Islands with a stronger 
economy, a cleaner government, and a 
more confident people.
ron crocombe and
marjorie tuainekore crocombe
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French Polynesia
The French resumption of nuclear test-
ing in the Pacific continued to domi-
nate territorial politics in the latter half 
of 1995. A clear divide emerged 
between the pro-independence move-
ment and nongovernment organiza-
tions that campaigned against the tests, 
and the Tahoeraa government, which 
pragmatically sought economic and 
political concessions from Paris in 
return for its support of the testing 
policy. Although France announced a 
permanent cessation of testing at the 
end of January, Tahitian politics con-
tinued to be polarized. The split was 
confirmed in the May territorial elec-
tions when the loyalist Tahoeraa won 
the lion’s share of the votes but the 
pro-independence Tavini made surpris-
ing gains and garnered most of the 
remaining seats.
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tions in June 1995, antinuclear pro-
tests gathered momentum, spurred on 
by regional and international support. 
The Rainbow Warrior II’s highly pub-
licized foray into the exclusion zone at 
Moruroa in July boosted the anti-test-
ing campaign’s profile. Thanks to 
dramatic satellite television footage, 
France was criticized worldwide for 
what was perceived as an excessive use 
of force by French commandos who 
stormed the Greenpeace ship and 
arrested its unarmed crew. This event 
was the watershed for an extension of 
the anti-testing campaign from the 
South Pacific to Europe.
Tahitian President Gaston Flosse 
and his government exerted enormous 
energy to allay fears about the under-
ground test program’s impact on 
health and the environment. In a major 
publicity stunt in July, Flosse and his 
entire cabinet made a three-day visit to 
Moruroa where they inspected the 
sites, ate local fish and coconuts, and 
swam in the lagoon in an effort to 
demonstrate that the environment was 
safe. This exercise was repeated in 
August for the benefit of twenty-one 
Polynesian mayors. On the regional 
front, Flosse led delegations to Pacific 
Island nations to explain the test policy 
and the program’s safety record. He 
also made offers of development aid 
on behalf of France, which some 
nations, such as Tonga, accepted.
Fears that a test resumption would 
prompt a regional boycott of the Tenth 
Pacific Games hosted by Tahiti in 
August proved unfounded. Although 
pro-independence leader Oscar 
Temaru had advocated such a boycott, 
all but three South Pacific Forum countries opted to participate in the 
games. Despite veiled threats by some 
antinuclear activists that the safety of 
athletes could not be guaranteed, the 
games proceeded without any violent 
incidents. Rather than punishing the 
territory for a policy beyond its con-
trol, the Forum focused its anti-testing 
campaign against the government in 
metropolitan France.
Antinuclear sentiment within the 
territory reached fever pitch in the 
lead-up to the first test on 5 September. 
The following day riots erupted in 
Tahiti, ostensibly in reaction to the 
test. The trouble began when some 
thirty Maohi women engaged in an 
antinuclear sit-in on the runway at 
Faaa airport, and French police tried 
to forcefully remove them. At the time, 
members of the A Tia I Mua trade 
union were holding a rally to drum up 
support for a general strike to raise the 
basic wage. When they became aware 
of the women’s predicament, a hard 
core of militant unionists proceeded to 
the airport to intervene. Faced with a 
large and angry crowd of Maohi men, 
the police began to fire tear gas into 
the melee. The confrontation between 
protesters and police quickly 
descended into violence.
Scores of disaffected youth from the 
poor suburb of Faaa were alerted and 
soon joined the fracas at the airport. 
Altogether several hundred local men 
ran amok. They set fire to the airport 
building and incinerated over a hun-
dred cars in the parking lot. The battle 
at the airport raged all day long. In the 
evening the mob moved on to torch 
and pillage shops in downtown 
Pape‘ete. Looters were unobstructed as 
security forces had concentrated on 
political reviews • polynesia 229regaining control of the airport and 
protecting government buildings. A 
small number of rioters continued their 
destructive activities until the evening 
of the next day, when appeals by Oscar 
Temaru finally brought an end to the 
rampage. The total cost of damage to 
the airport and town center was 
approximately a$51 million.
Accusations abounded as political 
leaders sought to lay blame for the 
riots. The general tendency was to 
hold the French state responsible for 
being inadequately prepared for the 
social unrest that was likely to accom-
pany the test series. The French high 
commissioner’s professed surprise at 
the riots was widely decried as naive in 
view of the volatile atmosphere pre-
vailing in the capital before the first 
test. Both the French and territorial 
governments maintained that the pres-
ence of foreign media and antinuclear 
activists had contributed to the ten-
sions that provoked the riot.
The Tahoeraa government and local 
media targeted Temaru and A Tia I 
Mua trade union leader Hiro Tefaarere 
as the protagonists behind the riots. 
Tefaarere was implicated directly as he 
was present when the clashes at the 
airport began. He went underground 
but was arrested and charged by police 
a few days later. Moreover, a large 
number of participants in the riots 
were A Tia I Mua members and Tavini 
Party youth. Tavini youth had been 
drawn to the fray by reports from the 
pro-independence Radio Tefana. In 
June, three employees of the radio sta-
tion received heavy fines from the 
court for their part in inciting unrest.
Both A Tia I Mua and Tavini denied 
that they had encouraged their mem-bers to riot. Certainly Temaru has long 
advocated democratic and nonviolent 
methods to achieve his party’s goals. In 
addition, he was instrumental in calm-
ing the agitated youth. It was also clear 
that only a few hundred individuals 
engaged in the violence, and they could 
scarcely be taken to represent the inde-
pendence movement as a whole. 
Despite disavowals of involvement by 
the proponents of independence, the 
western media and regional govern-
ments tended to portray the rioters as 
antinuclear and anticolonial crusaders.
A more likely explanation for the 
riots was that they reflected deepening 
tensions in Tahitian society. Riots in 
1987 and 1991 were ignited, not by 
anti-French sentiment, but by indus-
trial unrest and attempts by the territo-
rial government to increase taxes. 
Rioters have been mainly young, 
unemployed Maohi men disillusioned 
with their place in society. Many do 
appear to be followers of Temaru but 
are not under his control. In October, 
the French minister for overseas terri-
tories acknowledged that a social crisis 
engendered by inequality had caused 
the riots. Unless policies are devised to 
reduce social inequality, especially ris-
ing unemployment among Maohi, 
there is likely to be further unrest. 
However, the immediate outlook for 
social and economic development 
looks decidedly mixed.
French Polynesia’s economy experi-
enced a downturn as a result of inter-
national condemnation of the nuclear 
test series. The hardest hit sector was 
tourism, which is the territory’s main 
source of foreign exchange after 
French aid. In 1995, territorial author-
ities were confident of achieving an all-
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ists. By mid-year this goal was well 
within reach, but ultimately was not 
realized as a result of the hostile inter-
national reaction to nuclear testing. 
The test resumption, along with satu-
ration coverage by the international 
media of antinuclear protests and the 
September riots, caused tourists to stay 
away in droves. Despite the cessation 
of testing, and a concerted publicity 
campaign by the territorial govern-
ment to woo back the tourists, the sec-
tor will take a long time to recover.
The closure of the test center 
revived perennial concerns over how 
the territory would make up for the 
sudden shortfall in income and 
employment. In recognition of the ter-
ritory’s economic difficulties, and to 
deflect foreign criticism of the French 
presence in Tahiti, President Chirac 
promised annual financial aid to the 
territory to the tune of 990 million 
French francs (a$243 million) for 
another ten years. This sum is in addi-
tion to recurrent expenditure by the 
French state and funds already com-
mitted under the terms of the ten-year 
development plan agreed in January 
1994.
The final test series provided a wel-
come chance for the territorial govern-
ment to extract new political conces-
sions from France. No sooner had the 
test resumption been announced than 
President Flosse began to press for 
reforms to the statute of internal 
autonomy, which governs the terri-
tory’s relationship with France. Flosse 
realized that several factors were oper-
ating in favor of his plan to secure 
greater autonomy for the territory.
Since its inception, Flosse’s Tahoe-raa Party has been allied with the Ras-
semblement Pour la Republique, which 
by March 1995 controlled both the 
parliament and presidency in France. 
Moreover, Tahoeraa had lobbied ear-
nestly on behalf of Chirac during the 
presidential election campaign and 
went to great lengths to justify the 
nuclear test resumption, both locally 
and within the region. The Tahoeraa 
government expected a quid pro quo 
for the loyalty demonstrated to its met-
ropolitan allies. France for its part was 
keen to keep the territorial government 
on side, particularly as it was experi-
encing international isolation as a 
nuclear pariah.
For months, Flosse and his aides 
worked behind the scenes in negotia-
tions with state authorities to reform 
the statute. The Territorial Assembly 
then adopted its version of the revised 
statute in November and forwarded it 
to Paris for approval. It constituted an 
ambitious wish-list, parts of which 
France agreed to, while other demands 
were deemed politically unacceptable 
or incompatible with the French con-
stitution. Both the National Assembly 
and the Senate made amendments, but 
the revised statute was later subjected 
to further amendments by the Consti-
tutional Council before it entered into 
force on 23 April.
Aspects of the original draft to be 
rejected included a request to elevate 
the Tahitian language to equal status 
with French. The territory renewed a 
long-standing demand to exercise com-
plete control over immigration, but 
obtained a lesser power in its stead, the 
right to issue work permits to foreign-
ers. A proposal to institute a territorial 
audio-visual council to regulate televi-
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refused. Other claims by the territory 
to assume control over areas such as 
the criminal code, the oversight of 
public freedoms, the licensing of pri-
vate associations, and the regulation of 
land and property transactions were 
similarly denied.
The most significant reform to the 
statute was that France relinquished to 
the territory control over exploitation 
of marine resources in the exclusive 
economic zone. In theory the state 
retains sovereign rights over the zone, 
but in practice the territory has unfet-
tered freedom to exploit the five-mil-
lion-square-kilometer zone, provided 
France’s international treaty obliga-
tions are respected. Another advance 
was a clearer specification of the terri-
tory’s powers in areas where France 
may not intervene or retrospectively 
annul legislation, which had often 
been a cause for conflict between the 
state and the territory in the past.
One statutory change that provoked 
controversy in the territory involved a 
substantial expansion in presidential 
powers. For example, the president 
was given the power to approve gov-
ernment contracts, public service 
appointments, and to authorize the 
official journal. Critics were concerned 
about the greater opportunities for 
corruption if too much power were 
concentrated in the hands of one indi-
vidual. Another controversial measure 
removed the limit on the number of 
ministers the president could appoint 
to his cabinet. This too was perceived 
as potentially increasing the scope for 
political patronage, not to mention 
considerably increasing the cost of 
government.In view of political developments 
over the preceding year it was difficult 
to predict the outcome of the territo-
rial elections held in May. It was 
widely expected that Tahoeraa would 
retain government through its strong 
performance in the June 1995 munici-
pal elections and its demonstrated abil-
ity to obtain economic and political 
concessions from Paris. However, its 
unpopular stance in supporting the 
final series of nuclear tests could have 
alienated support. Conversely, the pro-
independence party, Tavini, had capi-
talized on the strength of internal and 
external opposition to the tests and 
received unprecedented publicity for 
its cause. But with the permanent clo-
sure of the test center more than three 
months before the poll, residual resent-
ment against France over the nuclear 
tests could not be relied on to boost 
Tavini’s fortunes on polling day.
As in the past, this election cam-
paign was remarkable for the paucity 
of coherent or detailed policies offered 
by the political parties. The virtues of 
independence versus autonomy and 
the state of the economy were the main 
topics on the agenda, but even these 
key issues did not provoke a significant 
policy debate. The Tahoeraa Party 
focused on its record in government 
and its good relations with France, and 
employed scare tactics over the perils 
of putting another party in govern-
ment. In the absence of nuclear testing, 
Tavini sought alternative nationalist 
symbols to attract support for indepen-
dence. One such issue was the long-
standing grassroots campaign to pre-
vent the Meridien chain from building 
a hotel at Rivnac in an outer suburb of 
Tahiti. Nationalists have decried the 
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construction site is on an ancient 
Maohi burial ground.
The elections not only confirmed 
Tahoeraa’s status as the dominant 
party in the territory, but gave it an 
absolute majority with 22 of the 41 
seats in the Territorial Assembly. Yet 
this victory was not achieved at the 
expense of the independence move-
ment. Tavini more than doubled its 
share of territorial councilors from 4 
to 10 seats. Soon after the elections, 
Tavini’s representation rose to 11 seats 
with the addition of an independent. 
The only other party to gain meaning-
ful representation was Emile Vernau-
don’s Ai‘a Api, which held on to the 5 
seats it had won in the last elections in 
1991. Once again,  Ai‘a Api opted to 
join in a coalition government with 
Tahoeraa.
The main casualty at the poll was 
Here Ai‘a. Once the foremost autono-
mist party in the territory, Here Ai‘a 
had been debilitated by poor leader-
ship under Jean Juventin and factional 
in-fighting. New leader Tony Hiro 
revised the party platform and con-
tested the elections under the banner of 
Alliance 2000, but won only one seat 
in the Austral Islands. The remaining 
seats went to Boris Léontieff, an inde-
pendent but conservative voice; 
Tinomana Ebb, nominally in favor
of independence but also an ally of 
Flosse; and Lucien Kimitete, who won 
on a platform that the Marquesas 
should stay within the French Republic 
in the event that Tahiti gains indepen-
dence.
The strength of Tahoeraa’s win can 
in part be attributed to the electoral 
system in French Polynesia, which favors the outer islands. These sparsely 
populated electoral districts may need 
only several hundred votes to elect a 
representative to the assembly. In the 
urban areas, where support for inde-
pendence is the strongest, over 2000 
votes are necessary to acquire a seat. 
The densely populated Windward 
Islands comprise 74 percent of the 
population but account for only 54 
percent of the seats in the assembly. 
Tahoeraa thus concentrated its cam-
paign in the other largely conservative 
archipelagos, which have exhibited 
most loyalty to France. As the incum-
bent government, the party was able to 
tour the outer islands and distribute 
largesse before the elections.
The electoral gains by Tavini dem-
onstrate a groundswell in support for 
independence that can no longer be 
confused with the antinuclear vote. 
This trend was most marked in Tahiti, 
where poor urban Maohi are less con-
vinced of the benefits derived from 
remaining with France. In this election 
the party also benefited from greater 
pragmatism in building alliances with 
individuals who could attract votes. 
This collaboration was in part a conse-
quence of links forged during the anti-
testing campaign in 1995.
A notable addition to Tavini’s list 
was Jacqui Drollet, hitherto leader of 
Ia Mana, the main party competing 
with Tavini for the independence vote 
in previous elections. Temaru and 
Drollet thus finally put aside their 
ideological and personal differences
to further the campaign for indepen-
dence. Hiro Tefaarere, who was leader 
of the territory’s largest trade union, A 
Tia I Mua, until his implication in the 
riots, also joined Tavini’s team. A sur-
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was former Territorial President Alex-
andre Léontieff who, until recently, 
had been a staunch opponent of inde-
pendence. Drollet and Léontieff, 
whose respective parties appeared to 
be in irreversible decline, no doubt 
judged that their only chance of reelec-
tion was to join forces with Tavini.
The independence movement has 
cause to celebrate its gains in the 1996 
elections, which were far better than 
anticipated. The extent of this increase 
was especially surprising given that 
French testing had been officially ter-
minated in January, after which France 
signed the protocols to the South 
Pacific Nuclear Free Zone treaty in 
March. For thirty years nuclear testing 
had constituted a focus for territorial 
nationalists in their campaign against 
the French presence. In the absence of 
this powerful and evocative symbol the 
Tavini Party not only maintained, but 
significantly increased, its level of sup-
port. Nevertheless, in the short term, 
prospects for advancing the indepen-
dence cause are limited in view of the 
size of the loyalist Tahoeraa’s win and 
of France’s commitment to continue 
providing high levels of financial assis-
tance.
karin von strokirch
MÂORI ISSUES
Ongoing tension between government 
and Mâori over unsatisfactory 
progress in settling Mâori claims con-
tinued to dominate the Mâori political 
scene. By September 1995 both sides 
had become entrenched. Paramount 
chief of a central North Island tribe Sir Hepi Te Heuheu had called two 
national hui, both of which were 
attended by over a thousand Mâori 
from across the political spectrum and 
from a full range of tribal and pan-
tribal bodies. Despite a wide range of 
opinion, there was consensus that con-
stitutional change was required in 
order to give appropriate recognition 
to and status for the Treaty of Wait-
angi. Since the signing of the treaty in 
1840, Mâori have sought to ensure 
that the guarantee of tino rangatira-
tanga, or Mâori sovereignty or auton-
omy, is upheld. Denial of this 
guarantee by successive New Zealand 
governments, including the present 
one, has ensured that Mâori have been 
unable to fully participate in New 
Zealand society.
In order to advance the debate on 
constitutional change, the national 
Mâori forum established working par-
ties. Mâori from a wide range of politi-
cal and intellectual backgrounds 
pooled their energies and expertise to 
help develop robust strategies aimed at 
enabling Mâori to regain control of 
their own lives. When the working 
parties reported back in January 1996, 
the third national Mâori hui resolved 
to mount an extensive education pro-
gram for Mâori around the country to 
prepare them for constitutional 
change.
Meanwhile Prime Minister Jim 
Bolger was declaring that no one, 
including Mâori, really knew what 
Mâori sovereignty or tino rangatira-
tanga was, and he refused to enter 
into, or even permit, any discussion on 
the matter. He confidently asserted 
that the sovereignty of the New 
Zealand parliament is, and will always 
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several quarters to the contrary. The 
tension between Mâori and the 
government was heightened when he 
announced that, despite the unani-
mous rejection by Mâori of the gov-
ernment’s proposed policy for settling 
claims, the government would press on 
with developing the proposal into full 
government policy. His government’s 
refusal to consider abandoning the 
proposal sent a clear message that 
Mâori policy would continue to be 
developed and determined by those 
who know little or nothing about the 
realities of Mâori history, culture, and 
social circumstances. It also guaran-
teed ongoing demonstrations of Mâori 
anger and frustration.
The prime minister’s attitude 
toward Mâori over recent years drew 
severe criticism from several opposi-
tion members, with charges of racism 
being leveled at him and other govern-
ment members on more than one occa-
sion in the House. Support for Mâori 
from non-Mâori outside the House 
came from a range of sources, includ-
ing many churches, the Combined 
Trade Unions, the Federated Farmers, 
and several international visitors. In 
particular, South African President 
Nelson Mandela went out of his way 
during his time in New Zealand for the 
Commonwealth Heads of Government 
meeting in November to acknowledge 
Mâori as the indigenous people of 
New Zealand and accord them the 
respect they deserved. He went so far 
as to abandon his prepared speech 
notes in Auckland to suggest to the 
government that it has a lot of work to 
do to improve the plight of Mâori and 
rectify their marginalization in their own country. Despite the deliberately 
pointed nature of his comments, Auck-
land’s (and the country’s) most widely 
read daily newspaper did not report 
them. Mâori media, on the other hand, 
gave them full coverage.
Mâori remained unmoved in the 
face of the prime minister’s onslaught. 
Different hapû (subtribal groupings) 
throughout the North Island continued 
to occupy lands taken from them in 
breach of the Treaty of Waitangi, 
although media interest in them 
declined. But with Mâori–government 
relations severely strained immedi-
ately after the September national 
Mâori hui, the government’s attempts 
to quell one particular protest back-
fired badly. The result of the actions 
left permanent scars and divisions in 
the small community at the center of 
the protest.
The protest had been mounted by 
members of a hapû from Takahue in 
the Far North, where they had taken 
over an old school site that they 
wanted returned to them. The govern-
ment was goaded into action against 
the protest by the national news media 
giving prominent coverage to the 
refusal of Mâori to move off the site. 
On the same day, the media also broke 
the news of a report to parliament by 
the auditor-general that severely criti-
cized the government’s proposed 
claims-settlement policy. The next day, 
the government instructed the police to 
remove the Takahue protesters from 
the school site. The police did so, and 
the school was burned to the ground.
For the second time in 1995 the 
media and parliament focused on and 
sensationalized Mâori protest. The 
prime minister used the incident to 
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site when the fire was lit. Both he and 
the media were very quick to blame
the Takahue protesters for the fire, 
although the protesters were equally 
adamant that they had nothing to do 
with it. Mâori radio stations through-
out the country were the only news 
media to broadcast the protesters’ 
statement that two of their party had 
seen a member of the police squad set-
ting the school alight. Tribal leaders 
from the area were divided, some plac-
ing complete blame for the loss of the 
school on the protesters, while others 
blamed the government and its deter-
mination to maintain unquestioned 
control over Mâori.
When all the smoke surrounding the 
incident finally cleared several months 
and several court cases later, no one 
was charged with arson. Those 
arrested at the site were simply con-
victed of relatively minor offenses and 
discharged or given suspended sen-
tences. What the government had not 
taken into account in its actions at 
Takahue was the well-documented 
level of animosity that has existed 
between Mâori and the police force in 
the Far North for many years, arising 
as a result of the depressed economy 
and widespread Mâori poverty in the 
area. At the end of day, the protesters’ 
report on who they had seen setting 
the school alight that day was never 
disproved. A call by the opposition for 
a full inquiry into the incident was 
quickly quashed by the government.
In contrast to the Takahue incident, 
a second torching of a government 
building received almost no media 
attention. It came this time in the cen-
tral North Island after the government had been warned about increasing and 
potentially explosive situations involv-
ing the Department of Conservation 
and Mâori throughout the country in a 
June 1995 report. The report, from a 
Mâori member of the New Zealand 
Conservation Authority, was 
extremely embarrassing for the gov-
ernment. It outlined a broad spectrum 
of issues that needed urgent attention 
and laid responsibility for existing lev-
els of conflict between Mâori and the 
department squarely on the shoulders 
of the director-general of conservation. 
The department’s biggest problem is 
that it administers almost one-third of 
the land in New Zealand, almost all of 
which is under claim by Mâori. The 
department’s refusal to allow Mâori to 
participate in the management of those 
lands, or even to collect their custom-
ary food and other flora and fauna 
from them, has angered Mâori for 
many years. The department’s attitude 
in these matters is largely dictated by 
the very strong environmentalist lobby, 
the more powerful of whom have 
argued strongly against any Mâori 
involvement anywhere in the conserva-
tion estate.
While the minister of Mâori affairs 
took the report seriously, the minister 
of conservation, at the behest of his 
director-general, dismissed it out of 
hand, suppressing its publication for 
several months. As a result, the Mâori 
members of parliament tabled the 
report in the House in September, and 
demanded answers from the minister 
of conservation to a long list of 
questions. Mâori throughout the 
country backed up the report, demand-
ing that something be done. Following 
the torching of a Department of Con-
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ganui Mâori from the area made direct 
representations to the minister, who 
did finally take some remedial action, 
overruling his director-general in the 
process.
By May 1996, the government was 
trying to play down the tensions 
between itself and Mâori in the run-up 
to a general election. At this time the 
Waitangi Tribunal, the government- 
appointed body set up to inquire into 
and recommend remedies for breaches 
of the treaty, issued its landmark 
Taranaki Report. In finding in favor of 
the claimants, it listed numerous hor-
rendous violations of the legal, moral, 
and human rights of Taranaki Mâori 
by successive New Zealand govern-
ments right up to the present. The 
report sent a very strongly worded and 
stern message to the government about 
the unsatisfactory relationship between 
governments and Mâori. Not only did 
it severely criticize the current govern-
ment’s proposed claims-settlement pol-
icy, it also told it that the history of 
every New Zealand government had 
been one of dogged determination to 
destroy Mâori autonomy. This had 
been achieved by removing Mâori 
resources and economic bases from 
them, as well as by not affording them 
the recognition and respect owed them 
as indigenes. The tribunal found that 
such actions on the part of govern-
ments were not only clear violations of 
the Treaty of Waitangi, and very often 
also clearly illegal, they were also in 
breach of the international right of 
indigenes to constitutional status as 
first peoples. The tribunal also found 
that the level of determination with 
which governments have tried to destroy Mâori autonomy has been 
more than matched by Mâori determi-
nation to preserve that autonomy. The 
tribunal reminded the government that 
Mâori refer to their autonomy as tino 
rangatiratanga or mana motuhake.
The government’s response to the 
report was muted. The minister of 
treaty negotiations urged all New 
Zealanders to read it, but then would 
not subsidize its publication. The 
media complained bitterly at having to 
pay nz$100 for a copy, and rightly 
pointed out that as a result very few 
people would read it.
margaret mutu
Niue
Niue’s general election, held on 16 
February, came in the wake of the 
political stalemate that had left the 
Niue Assembly evenly divided since 
December 1994. Despite the gridlock 
brought about by the 10–10 standoff, 
the government of Premier Frank Lui 
held office to the end of its term.
The election was dominated by 
party politics. On one side was Premier 
Lui’s government, which rejected the 
idea that political parties were neces-
sary or useful for Niue’s political and 
economic development. On the other 
was the Niue People’s Party (npp), led 
by Young Vivian (who served briefly as 
Niue’s premier following the death of 
Robert Rex in 1992).
Consequently the election campaign 
was an unusual one, because in a sense 
only one side, the Niue People’s Party, 
took part. The party took its message 
around the island, holding election 
meetings, giving out party T-shirts and 
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island’s sole newspaper, the Niue Star, 
and on state-owned radio and televi-
sion.
By contrast, Premier Lui met with 
voters solely in his own village constit-
uency of Alofi North, in the capital, 
running on his government’s record. 
The rest of his team, de facto members 
of a government “party” but (in the 
absence of any party organization) at 
the same time all of them indepen-
dents, for the most part campaigned 
separately. Although there were some 
achievements for progovernment can-
didates to emphasize, their positions 
were somewhat reactive, since the 
Niue People’s Party more or less set the 
agenda. The main issue, seemingly, 
was whether party politics had a role 
to play in Niue’s future.
Each of the 1259 people on the elec-
toral roll had two votes—one was for 
one of the fourteen local electorate 
members of the Assembly, and the 
other treated the island as a single con-
stituency. Electors had the opportu-
nity to vote for up to six people, 
known as “common roll” members, 
who represent the island as a whole. 
This ballot invites much of the pre-
election speculation among Niueans 
and attracts a large number of candi-
dates. In 1993 a record number of can-
didates (24) vied for these six at-large 
positions; in 1996 there were origi-
nally 25, but one withdrew prior to the 
election.
Four of Niue’s village electorates 
went uncontested. At Hakupu, across 
the island from Alofi, Young Vivian 
was reelected unopposed. The Niue 
People’s Party gained a second seat 
before polling day, with the return to the Assembly for a second term of 
Pokotoa Sipeli at the village of Liku. 
At Vaiea, Talaititama Talaiti, at 25 
years of age the youngest member of 
the Assembly, also won his second 
term unopposed. Talaiti was a govern-
ment supporter, as was Namukulu’s 
Jack Willie, who was first elected its 
representative in 1987.
The government and the Niue Peo-
ple’s Party thus approached the Febru-
ary election deadlocked 2–2. There 
was competition between the two sides 
in the remaining ten village constituen-
cies, although the pre-election loyalties 
of some of the candidates were by no 
means entirely clear. In any case, elec-
toral opportunities were not altogether 
equal in each of these seats: in seven of 
them, incumbent Assembly members 
were standing for reelection and, on 
Niue as elsewhere, incumbents gener-
ally have an advantage. Six of these 
contests were two-person races, and in 
all but one the seat was held by the 
incumbent. The winners included Pre-
mier Lui (in Alofi North); Cabinet 
Minister Aokuso Pavihi (in Avatele); 
Fisa Pihigia (Niue People’s Party, in 
Tuapa); Hafe Vilitama (progovern-
ment, in Mutalau); and Dion Taufitu 
(Niue People’s Party, in Toi). The only 
seat to change hands was one in which 
at least one incumbent Assembly mem-
ber had to be defeated: in Alofi South, 
the local representative, Tukala Hekau, 
was challenged by Robert Rex, Jr, who 
had been elected as a common roll 
member in 1993 but was now seeking 
to represent his father’s (and, in a 
sense, his family’s) former constitu-
ency. Robert Rex, Jr’s victory meant 
that Hekau was the only incumbent 
member of the Assembly seeking 
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term, suggesting that the voters were 
unable or unwilling to punish either 
progovernment or pro-npp members 
for Niue’s deadlocked Assembly 
politics.
The overall election result was 
decided in the three village seats in 
which there were no incumbents seek-
ing a further term. In two of these, 
Tamakautoga and Lakepa, elderly or 
unwell Assembly members had decided 
to step aside, and in each seat three 
candidates strove to succeed them. In 
Tamakautoga, Umuti Makani was 
elected, replacing the retiring Ikifotu 
Manamana (an npp supporter). In 
Lakepa, John Tiakia won his three-
way race, keeping the seat safe for the 
government. At Makefu, the local rep-
resentative, Uluvili Tohovaka (Niue 
People’s Party), decided not to seek 
reelection in the village after being 
influenced to stand for a common-roll 
seat instead; he withdrew that candi-
dacy as well prior to the election. 
Tohovaka had defeated Ataloma Misi-
hepi in 1993, but this time Misihepi, a 
progovernment independent, gained a 
narrow victory.
In the remaining village, Hikuta-
vake, the election-night result was a 
tie: 20 votes each for incumbent 
Assembly member Opili Talafasi, an 
npp supporter, and Lagaloga Mitikose. 
As Talafasi had received 36 votes in 
1993 (and Mitikose 9), the outcome 
demonstrated a substantial move of 
voter sentiment against Talafasi, 
though not enough to cost him the 
seat. There had been a tied vote at the 
1993 election as well (in Avatele, 
which was decided in favor of Pavihi 
after Niue’s Chief Justice John Dillon flew up from Wellington on a special 
flight in order to resolve the tie 
through the toss of a coin). This time, 
with the experience of 1993 behind 
them—the special flight to oversee the 
coin toss was said to have irritated the 
chief justice, and used a procedure not 
required under either the Niue Consti-
tution or its electoral act—the Hikuta-
vake tie was settled by drawing a name 
from a hat (under supervision, and 
with a telephone link to Wellington). 
The winner was Talafasi, who also sur-
vived an election petition challenging 
the result, but his victory was not 
enough for the Niue People’s Party.
The parties won an equal number of 
the common-roll seats that had 
inspired so much attention, but the Lui 
government won a slender majority of 
the 14 village seats. Niue’s top vote 
getter was Minister of Finance Terry 
Coe, who in 1993 had been the first 
ethnic non-Niuean to win a seat in the 
Assembly. His cabinet colleague, 
O‘love Tauveve Jacobsen, came sec-
ond, while in third place was progov-
ernment incumbent Poni Kapaga. That 
three highly visible progovernment 
Assembly members, including two cab-
inet ministers, topped the poll suggests 
that, overall, Niue’s voters had decided 
that the npp team was not yet ready to 
be given control over the island’s 
finances. Coe’s 549 votes and first-
place finish were a significant improve-
ment over 1993 (when he came third 
with 430 votes); Jacobsen came second 
on the common roll in both elections, 
while Kapaga improved his perfor-
mance slightly (he had come fourth in 
1993).
The weakness of a nonparty 
approach was also revealed in the 
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no clear government ticket for anti-npp 
electors to support. As a result, their 
votes for the remaining three common-
roll Assembly seats were dispersed 
among a number of independents, 
none of them incumbent Assembly 
members. The Niue People’s Party—
which had a much clearer party ticket, 
and whose supporters showed consid-
erable discipline in following it—was 
able to win the fourth, fifth, and sixth 
common-roll seats. These were won by 
Toeono Togatule, formerly assistant 
secretary to government (and ex-direc-
tor of public works), and a newcomer 
to the Assembly; Michael Jackson 
(who had topped the poll in 1993 with 
548 votes, but had lost considerable 
support by 1996, receiving only 386 
votes), and, in sixth position, former 
Finance Minister Sani Lakatani, not-
withstanding ongoing legal action 
being taken against him by the 
government.
In the immediate aftermath of the 
election, both the government and the 
Niue People’s Party sought to win 
wavering Assembly members over to 
their respective sides. Both the premier 
and the party appeared confident. Pre-
mier Lui had little to offer to ambitious 
Assembly members. The size of Niue’s 
Cabinet is limited by its constitution to 
four ministers (including the premier), 
and all of Lui’s Cabinet colleagues had 
been reelected. A postelection meeting 
between Premier Lui and Robert Rex, 
Jr, who had taken an independent 
stance critical of the government but 
had an uneasy relationship with the 
Niue People’s Party as well, was unable 
to win Rex over to the government’s 
side. The Niue People’s Party was in a more flexible position after the elec-
tion, but attempts to entice progovern-
ment independents to its side proved 
futile.
When the Assembly convened days 
after the election, the Speaker of the 
House, Sam Tagelagi, was voted out of 
office (after serving for twenty-three 
years) by an 11–9 margin. He was 
defeated by High Court Commissioner 
John Funaki, who was the govern-
ment’s choice for Speaker. The Lui 
government had become unhappy with 
Tagelagi’s conduct as Speaker and the 
vote (which preceded the vote for pre-
mier) foreshadowed Lui’s reelection
by an identical margin. Lui defeated 
Robert Rex, Jr, who was a surprise 
choice as npp leader in a move 
intended to attract independent 
Assembly members over from the gov-
ernment side. The result meant that 
Premier Lui was able to begin his sec-
ond successive three-year term as head 
of government with the smallest pos-
sible majority. But he has already 
shown that he has the ability, and the 
tenacity, to stay in power with few 
votes at his disposal and little room for 
maneuver.
Lui had been able to secure passage 
of the government’s budget in October 
1995 by requiring the Assembly to 
consider a vote of confidence in the 
cabinet. The move had revealed a split 
in npp ranks and apprehension among 
npp supporters about the electoral con-
sequences of rejecting the budget and 
forcing an early election. As a result 
Young Vivian had no option but to 
negotiate a withdrawal of the govern-
ment’s motion, which was achieved in 
return for the Niue People’s Party sup-
porting the budget (which it had ini-
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Assembly).
The budget sitting came three days 
after the Niue High Court found the 
sacking of three npp Assembly mem-
bers to have been invalid. The case 
came about when the government used 
a colonial Assembly Ordinance to dis-
miss party members who had been 
boycotting meetings of the Public 
Expenditure Committee. The chief 
electoral officer had declared their 
seats vacant but, with a general elec-
tion only months away, had indicated 
that no by-elections were to be held. If 
upheld, the government’s move would 
have broken the Assembly deadlock by 
giving it a 10–7 majority until the elec-
tions.
The Niue Government appealed 
against the decision reinstating the 
three members of the Assembly (Laka-
tani, Jackson, and Talafasi). The 
appeal became the first to be held 
before Niue’s Court of Appeal, which 
heard the case in Wellington and 
upheld the High Court ruling. The 
three-member Court of Appeal, set up 
by changes made to Niue’s constitution 
in 1992, also met in November to con-
sider another case involving Lakatani. 
He had been charged with twenty-two 
counts of bribery and two of official 
corruption, had pleaded not guilty, and 
had been remanded for a hearing 
before Chief Justice Dillon.
The case rested on interpretation of 
section 180 of the Niue Act dealing 
with “official corruption,” and essen-
tially rested on the question of whether 
the Act embraced conduct by members 
of the Assembly as well as cabinet min-
isters. The court concluded that mem-
bers of the Assembly “fall outside of the provisions of . . . the law of Niue” 
and therefore “they cannot be guilty of 
crimes of corruption or bribery.” It 
described the result as one which “may 
well be unsatisfactory” but stated that 
“[t]he gap in the Law is one for the 
Assembly to remedy.” Thus it allowed 
part of Lakatani’s appeal against 
charges brought against him, dismiss-
ing those that referred to his activities 
as an assemblyman but permitting his 
prosecution for activities as a “servant 
of the Crown,” that is, a cabinet 
minister.
In December 1995 the Lui govern-
ment again demonstrated its persis-
tence and commitment, using an 
opportunity to pass legislation that 
opened up when one of the npp Assem-
bly members was forced to leave Niue 
for medical treatment. In his absence 
the government was able to secure 
Assembly approval for the long-
delayed Tourist Authority Bill as well 
as a controversial measure requiring 
New Zealanders to gain permits to 
stay on Niue for longer than thirty 
days (and to apply for permission to 
work and live permanently on the 
island).
A child welfare program was also 
approved, giving each person under 
the age of seventeen $100 a year 
(ostensibly for school uniforms and 
sports equipment), with another $10 
annually to be given to the Niue High 
School or Niue Primary School Parent 
Teachers Association. The program—a 
financial windfall for Niueans with 
children at school—was no doubt a 
factor in the strong electoral perfor-
mance by the responsible cabinet min-
ister, Tauveve Jacobsen.
Niue’s October Constitution Day 
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for the leaders of the Small Islands 
States (Kiribati, Tuvalu, the Cook 
Islands, and Nauru, as well as Niue) to 
meet in Alofi. Topics discussed 
included reductions in public services, 
privatization of government-run activi-
ties, airline and shipping services in the 
Pacific, and development aid. The cele-
brations proved a significant milestone 
in Niue’s national life. About two hun-
dred people attended from overseas 
(mostly from New Zealand), and 
guests of honor included New 
Zealand’s then governor-general, the 
popular Dame Catherine Tizard, as 
well as representatives of the New 
Zealand Government and the opposi-
tion Labour Party. Representatives 
from Australia and Papua New Guinea 
also attended ceremonies, as did the 
leaders of the Small Islands States.
Some development projects were 
successfully completed during the 
period under review, most notably the 
airport runway resealing and extension 
project. The runway extension was 
officially opened by the governor-gen-
eral, who subsequently boarded a spe-
cial Royal New Zealand Air Force jet 
and flew back to Wellington. The 
project, funded by New Zealand, pro-
duced an asphalt runway capable of 
handling 767 jets; unfortunately, the 
completion of a world-class runway 
coincided with the withdrawal from 
Niue of the one scheduled passenger 
jet service it already had. Air Nauru’s 
unprofitable flights were discontinued 
in August 1995 and were succeeded by 
a much less impressive service from 
Royal Tongan Airlines. The absence of 
very many aircraft landings or takeoffs 
suggests that Niue’s runway may be in good condition for a long time to 
come, but the same cannot be said of 
its tourist industry. Unless a new air 
service is organized, the island’s hopes 
for prosperity through international 
tourism are certain to be disappointed.
However, work continued on the 
island’s new Matavai resort, a nz$2.5 
million project on a cliff-top site, a pri-
vate enterprise investment made possi-
ble through government financial 
support. Income generated by Niue’s 
export taro scheme, as well as further 
plantings in the afforestation program, 
may also be counted as development 
successes. Niue’s Broadcasting House, 
which houses its television and radio 
stations and can serve as a national 
disaster center if required, was also 
completed. It was officially opened by 
the Australian high commissioner, hav-
ing been funded in part by Australian 
aid as well as undp assistance.
A setback occurred, however, when 
the New Zealand Navy’s channel 
blasting program proved a bit too 
explosive, causing extensive damage to 
the wharf in the capital, Alofi. The 
navy was required to carry out neces-
sary repairs, which proved both time-
consuming and expensive. The acci-
dent meant that cargo ships were 
forced to anchor offshore and unload 
onto barges.
Postelection financial developments 
were also unpromising. Increases in 
government spending (to nz$27 mil-
lion annually), on projects such as the 
cross-island road-sealing program, a 
street-lighting program for Niue’s vil-
lages, and an islandwide high-tech cell-
phone project, all contributed to 
predictions of an increase in the gov-
ernment’s budget deficit. There were 
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ticularly among younger, skilled peo-
ple, and the tourist industry was at an 
almost complete standstill. Niue’s 
progress toward greater international 
recognition for its self-governing status 
was also interrupted when the United 
States not only blocked Niue’s applica-
tion for membership in the Asian 
Development Bank, but refused to 
meet with representatives of the Niue 
Government at the Manila meeting lest 
such discussions be interpreted as 
granting Niue a status that the United 
States does not agree it is entitled to 
enjoy.
Niue continued to play a role in 
regional affairs, however. The govern-
ment joined antinuclear testing pro-
tests against the French, and 17 of the 
20 members of parliament signed a 
petition that was lodged with the 
French Embassy in Wellington. Niue 
also withdrew from the South Pacific 
Games in Tahiti in protest against the 
French actions.
Niue’s Constitution Review Com-
mittee was reconvened in 1996 to con-
sider possible constitutional changes, 
and it was likely that the government 
would move to amend the legislation 
dealing with official corruption in light 
of the Court of Appeal ruling. Govern-
ment solicitors were working on 
updating legislation inherited from the 
pre-self-government period.
Other signs of political change on 
the island were evident during the elec-
tion. The three-way race at Makefu 
village included the candidacy of 
Stafford Guest, who was the first non-
Niuean to stand in a village constitu-
ency since self-government. Similarly, 
in Hikutavake the third-place finisher was another person seeking to chal-
lenge village norms: Salapiga Tutaki-
toa, who would have been the first 
woman to represent a village in the 
Assembly had she won. Although each 
candidate was ultimately unsuccess-
ful—suggesting that at this stage the 
criteria for village representatives are 
more strict, and more traditional, than 
for the common-roll seats—their 
involvement in electoral politics at vil-
lage level continues a process of social 
change and communal development 
that has the overall effect of widening 
opportunities to take part in Niue’s 
national life.
stephen levine
Tokelau
Tokelau moved closer to responsible 
self-government in 1995–96. As fore-
shadowed in last year’s review (see 
Levine 1996, 201), amendments to the 
New Zealand Parliament’s Tokelau 
Act 1948 seemed appropriate, both to 
bring the legislation into line with 
moves being taken in Tokelau toward 
self-government, and to formally 
locate legislative authority with Toke-
lau’s supreme national body, the Gen-
eral Fono.
The Tokelau Amendment Bill was 
introduced in parliament on 19 
December 1995. Sir Robin Gray, New 
Zealand’s associate minister of foreign 
affairs and trade, introducing the mea-
sure, noted that the bill had “substan-
tial significance for both New Zealand 
and Tokelau. It acknowledges that 
Tokelau is moving through an impor-
tant process of constitutional change, 
leading to self-government and an act 
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the United Nations. Equally, it 
acknowledges New Zealand’s respon-
sibility to Tokelau, the international 
community, and specifically the United 
Nations to support and encourage the 
process” (New Zealand Parliamentary 
Debates, 19 Dec 1995, 10860).
The bill, which received the unqual-
ified support of Tokelau’s three faipule, 
was also described as part of an evolu-
tionary process, linking the empower-
ment of the General Fono with earlier 
moves to establish “a national-level 
administration on the atolls to provide 
leadership in areas outside the compe-
tence of individual villages.” Such 
measures have included the relocation 
of the public service from Apia to 
Tokelau, the delegation of powers 
from New Zealand’s public service to 
two Tokelau public service commis-
sioners, and the delegation of the 
Wellington-based administrator of 
Tokelau’s powers to the General Fono 
(and to the Council of Faipule when 
the General Fono is not in session)—all 
of these steps on the path to self-gov-
ernment documented in previous Toke-
lau reviews for The Contemporary 
Pacific.
Following the bill’s introduction 
(which was supported by the opposi-
tion Labour Party) it was referred, as 
requested, to the New Zealand Parlia-
ment’s Foreign Affairs and Defence 
Committee. The committee invited 
public submissions but did not receive 
any. It did receive advice, however, 
from Administrator Lindsay Watt (a 
member of the New Zealand Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs and Trade), and 
from the ministry’s legal advisers.
In its original form, the legislation proposed a number of important 
amendments to the Tokelau Act. The 
General Fono was given “a general 
power to make rules for the peace, 
order, and good government of Toke-
lau.” This meant that, subject only to 
certain qualifications, the General 
Fono was now explicitly identified in 
New Zealand law as the institution in 
Tokelau authorized to make “rules” 
with the force of law on the atolls. The 
General Fono was also given authority 
to “determine its own procedures for 
making rules,” and was required to 
print, “in Tokelauan and in English,” 
every rule made using its powers under 
the bill.
Consistent with Tokelau’s continu-
ing status as a New Zealand territory, 
the bill stipulated that no “rule” made 
by the General Fono may be “inconsis-
tent with [a]ny Act of the Parliament 
of New Zealand that is in force in 
Tokelau.” Similarly, rules passed by 
the General Fono which are inconsis-
tent with Tokelau’s “international obli-
gation[s]” are also “to the extent of the 
inconsistency . . . of no effect.” The bill 
gave the administrator a veto power 
over Fono decisions. Nevertheless the 
administrator is not expected to make 
much use of the powers that he retains 
under the Act.
Although the Foreign Affairs and 
Defence committee supported the pas-
sage of the bill, its report back to 
parliament included a number of 
recommendations as well as an overall 
commentary on the bill’s purposes and 
significance. Its most important 
amendment was an unusual and in 
some ways extraordinary one, with 
symbolic importance but also educa-
tional and practical value. The com-
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preamble to the bill, in both the Toke-
lauan and English languages. As the 
Standing Orders of the New Zealand 
Parliament do not give select commit-
tees the power to recommend the 
inclusion of a preamble, the committee 
recommended that the material be 
added to the bill at a later stage during 
its consideration by parliament. The 
preamble seemed necessary to the com-
mittee in part because while the overall 
purpose of the bill was “to confer 
greater legislative powers on Tokelau,” 
the procedure that had to be followed 
(so long as Tokelau remained a New 
Zealand territory) was for amend-
ments to be made to a New Zealand 
statute. A preliminary statement 
attached to the bill seemed the simplest 
way to convey to the people of Toke-
lau that nothing less than a “transfer 
of legislative powers” from the New 
Zealand Parliament to the General 
Fono was taking place.
The text of the preamble was devel-
oped in consultation with Tokelau and 
includes the full text of the Council of 
Faipule’s statement of 14 April 1995 
“explaining the reasons why the Gen-
eral Fono requires its own legislative 
power.” The preamble reviews Toke-
lau’s political history and status as part 
of New Zealand, and as a non-self-
governing territory under the charter 
of the United Nations. The preamble 
notes that while “the needs of Tokelau 
at a national level are the responsibility 
of the Government of New Zealand 
. . . the elders of Tokelau have for 
many years wished to have a greater 
and more direct involvement in the 
government of Tokelau at a national 
level.” It records Tokelau’s “wish to paddle its canoe to the greatest extent 
possible,” and the “long-standing 
desire by three dispersed atoll commu-
nities to come together and become 
stronger, on the basis of their shared 
language and culture, as one family 
and nation.” The preamble ends with a 
further affirmation of the faipule’s sup-
port: “Tokelau also welcomes this Act 
as a fresh breeze to fill the sails of 
Tokelau’s canoe, and in the knowledge 
that the conferral of legislative power 
is a step of large constitutional signifi-
cance which strengthens the General 
Fono in its role as Tokelau’s supreme 
national body.”
When the bill moved through its 
final stages in New Zealand’s Parlia-
ment, on 23 May, Don McKinnon, 
minister of foreign affairs and trade, 
emphasized that the House was send-
ing “a strong and encouraging signal 
to the people of Tokelau” by passing a 
measure that “responds to Tokelau’s 
clearly stated wishes.” Former Prime 
Minister David Lange—the only New 
Zealand head of government to visit 
the atolls—also contributed to the 
debate, describing Tokelau’s “extra-
ordinary sense of purpose,” its sense of 
nationhood, its desire to remain linked 
with New Zealand, and speaking with 
enthusiasm about the initiative to 
include a preamble in the Tokelau lan-
guage. Moments later the bilingual 
preamble was introduced in parlia-
ment and accepted as part of the bill, 
which was then passed into law.
If this measure was the most tangi-
ble step taken toward further self-gov-
ernment in the period under review, it 
was not the only one. In April 1996 
Tuvalu’s Prime Minister Kamuta Latasi 
made an official visit to Tokelau, the 
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of government. The Council of Faipule 
had visited Tuvalu in 1994 as part of a 
study tour to reflect on the post-self-
government experience of some of its 
neighbors. On 22 April a “Memoran-
dum of Understanding Between the 
Government of Tokelau and the Gov-
ernment of Tuvalu” was signed by 
Prime Minister Latasi and the Ulu-O-
Tokelau (on behalf of the Council of 
Faipule) Pio Tuia, at Nukunonu. The 
memorandum noted “the very close 
historical links and great geographical, 
social and cultural similarities” 
between the peoples of Tokelau and 
Tuvalu, affinities that were evident 
when Prime Minister Latasi’s remarks 
(in Tuvaluan) were understood by his 
Tokelauan audiences without any need 
for translation.
The agreement noted a desire for 
bilateral ties between the two govern-
ments and anticipated cooperation in 
the areas of shipping (Tokelau already 
uses a Tuvalu ship, which calls at each 
of Tokelau’s three atolls four times a 
year), air transport, trade, tourism, 
fisheries, and human resources devel-
opment. Recognizing “the historical 
links between the two countries” as 
well as potential “economic and social 
gains from free movement of citizens 
of both countries,” the two govern-
ments also agreed “that citizens from 
their countries be authorized a 30-day 
visa free entry” and promised to 
explore other ways “to improve the 
mobility of people and Labour.”
Ulu Pio Tuia was one of the newly 
elected faipule at the elections held 
between 4 and 11 January. His election 
in Nukunonu reflected his broad back-
ground of community service: he was a Deacon of the Catholic Church, had 
been a senior officer in Tokelau’s Pub-
lic Service, and was the principal of 
Nukunonu’s school. The other two 
members of the Council of Faipule, 
Kuresa Nasau (Atafu) and Falima Teao 
(Fakaofo), were also newly elected (all 
three incumbent faipule were 
defeated). Kuresa Nasau had served 
two previous terms as faipule up to 
1990 and his victory in 1996 was the 
most decisive of the three faipule elec-
tions. An absolute majority of votes 
cast is required to win office; in the 
absence of a majority, the lowest-poll-
ing (among the perhaps seven or eight 
nominees) is removed from the ballot 
until a majority is reached. In 1996 
only Kuresa Nasau was able to win a 
first-ballot victory.
The results continue the trend in 
Tokelau of electing more formally edu-
cated people as faipule. Kuresa Nasau 
was educated in Pago Pago and in 
Hawai‘i and also served for several 
years in the United States Army. Fal-
ima Teao was trained as a dentist at 
the Fiji School of Medicine and has 
been a senior government official on 
Fakaofo in recent years. All three 
faipule are in their early fifties. There 
was no formal campaign—candidates 
are judged by their deeds, reputation, 
and character—and any “issues” were 
local matters embracing family ties, 
personalities, and village relationships.
The three pulenuku elections were 
held at the same time. On Fakaofo and 
Nukunonu the sitting faipule, who had 
been defeated for reelection, were 
elected pulenuku. On Atafu a former 
pulenuku regained the position.
The process of political develop-
ment in Tokelau means that the posi-
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some years ago. The faipule is now not 
only the elected head of an atoll, but 
also a member of a national govern-
ment, with evolving ministerial respon-
sibilities. Each faipule also serves for 
one year as the head of government, 
the Ulu-O-Tokelau.
Following the 1996 election, on 24 
January, the administrator sent a mes-
sage to the newly elected faipule, 
noting that Tokelau’s “national gov-
ernment is seen to be complementing 
[its] village government.” He also 
observed that the Council of Faipule 
“has sought not only to act within tra-
dition, but to ensure that its decisions 
are in harmony with the country’s val-
ues.” As Tokelau continues with the 
process of drafting its own constitu-
tion, the administrator noted with sat-
isfaction that it is “not following the 
example of others who have used bor-
rowed sets of constitutional clothes, 
often to their later regret. Rather it is 
working from ‘the coral up’.”
The administrator’s message was 
translated and read to the 29–31 Janu-
ary Fono and two weeks later the Ulu 
replied, “I wish to stress one very 
important point which you more than 
alluded to in your message. And that 
is: the political process that Tokelau is 
engaging in . . . reflects accurately the 
wishes and aspirations of the people of 
Tokelau. It is a Tokelau driven process. 
Tokelau is keen for the outside world 
to know of this.” In closing with char-
acteristic eloquence, the Ulu used met-
aphorical language to discuss the 
process of political change on the 
atolls. “We fear the unknown, but it 
will not stop us. We see the woods and 
thus we are not afraid. But we want to feel the bark, the skin, of the ancient 
coconut tree. To know what we are 
dealing with—whether to chop it, 
prune it, give it a few more years, or to 
cut it to make posts for a new house. 
To make room for the young to grow 
and prosper to enjoy the new breeze.”
The new Ulu gave his inaugural 
address to the opening of the General 
Fono at Nukunonu in January. At that 
time, too, he expressed his hopes for 
the development of Tokelau. In his 
speech he emphasized unity, describing 
Tokelau as “the garland that ties us 
together,” observing that “[i]t is my 
hope that we are of one heart to work 
together to achieve for Tokelau one-
ness, goodness and peace.” The Ulu 
stressed the need to be “free to make 
our own decisions” while continuing 
“to work together with the Govern-
ment of New Zealand.” The speech 
affirmed Tokelau’s basic values—reli-
gious commitment, strong family 
bonds, and a determination “to trea-
sure our culture and traditions as the 
foundation and prime focus from 
which Tokelau as a nation is to be 
nurtured.”
Tokelau’s maturing as a political 
entity takes place against a back-
ground of United Nations interest. The 
administrator told a decolonization 
seminar in Port Moresby in June 1996 
that “Tokelau has its own distinctive-
ness,” and drew attention to the dra-
matic changes evident to the visiting 
UN mission in 1994 compared to three 
earlier visits (1976, 1981, and 1986). 
Tokelau’s readiness “to contemplate an 
act of self-determination” and its 
“active consideration” of a constitu-
tion were “a cumulative response to 
contact with the outside world,” but 
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strength in the reassertion of what is 
unique in Tokelauan values and cul-
ture.”
When the UN Committee of 
Twenty-Four next gives consideration 
to “the question of Tokelau” in July 
1996, it will be doing so in a new con-
text: Tokelau will be considered by the 
full committee (rather than by its sub-
committee) separately from other 
remaining non-self-governing territo-
ries, and the committee will receive a 
submission in person from a faipule 
for the first time since 1987. Further 
constitutional progress is expected in 
July, when the Special Constitution 
Committee reports to the Fono (fol-
lowing reports submitted to it from 
three subcommittees).
Against this background of consti-
tutional progress and institutional 
development, strides toward greater 
economic self-reliance are likely to be 
less impressive. The administrator’s 
Annual Report (for the year ended 30 
June 1995) noted the parameters and 
constraints: a “small population 
(1600) divided among three widely dis-
persed atolls, a heritage of subsistence 
living based on coconuts and fish, pau-
city of land (tiny islets rarely more 
than 200 meters wide and not more 
than five meters above sea level), 
absence of soil, reliance on rainfall for 
water, high cost of providing modern 
services.” The 1991 census described
a country with 253 family groups. 
“Nearly 200 people receive income 
directly from government, including 
village officials. In addition 210 people 
earn much smaller incomes as mem-
bers of the aumaga or village work 
force. The total earning capacity is estimated at $2 million. Yet it costs 
some $6 million to run Tokelau.”
The “big gap to fill” is largely met 
from New Zealand resources. Direct 
budget support is nz$4.3 million, with 
special project assistance for 1995–96 
running at $1.4 million. Tokelau’s con-
tribution has risen in recent years from 
around 17 percent to about 25 percent 
of its budgetary requirements, through 
taxes on local income and charges on 
local services. Significant funding from 
overseas sources will be required for 
the foreseeable future. Projects under-
way involve electricity generation, 
telephone and telecommunications 
services, and other activities associated 
with the costs of government. Eco-
nomic realities as well as shared values 
are among the factors encouraging 
Tokelau to look toward a future act of 
national self-determination likely to 
affirm the virtues of both self-govern-
ment and a continued national part-
nership with New Zealand.
stephen levine
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The Kingdom of Tonga
On 25 January 1996 Tongans went to 
the polls to select their representatives 
for the 1996–98 parliamentary term. 
Over 49,000 voters, about half the 
total population, registered, but only 
27,935 people voted, 808 fewer than 
in 1993. Nevertheless, the small turn-
out led to some surprises. The only 
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magnitude of the landslide win for the 
prodemocracy team. In the 1996 elec-
tion, confusion within prodemocracy 
ranks and the conflict that dogged its 
candidates’ campaign trail made voter 
behavior more complex. Seven reform-
ers out of the nine People’s Representa-
tives were returned, but they are by no 
means united as a concerted prode-
mocracy front. If anything, they are 
more divided than before the elections, 
and have been forced to admit that 
they are unable to work together.
The Tongan Legislative Assembly 
consists of eleven cabinet ministers, 
who are personally appointed for life 
by the monarch; nine Noble’s Repre-
sentatives elected by the twenty or so 
of their peers who have been installed 
in their noble title by the monarch; and 
nine People’s Representatives, who are 
elected by the remainder of the popula-
tion, approximately one hundred thou-
sand commoners. The selection of a 
small number of well-educated com-
moners as cabinet ministers is a rela-
tively recent phenomenon. When they 
are appointed, they become also hon-
orary nobles (‘eiki minisita). As a 
result, the Tongan parliament usually 
sees twenty nobles arrayed against nine 
People’s Representatives. The way the 
pack is stacked caused many people in 
Tonga to take up the catch-cry of 
“more democracy” and give a greater 
or lesser degree of support to the pro-
democracy movement.
After six or seven years, however, 
the cry has lost its novelty and much of 
its appeal. The prodemocracy move-
ment and its parliamentary representa-
tives have shown no program of 
action, no clear-cut achievable goals, and no agenda; or, rather, they have 
many different agendas that are seri-
ously at odds with one another. In 
1993, a promising group of reformers 
was elected to parliament to promote 
the prodemocracy cause. ‘Akilisi 
Pohiva, ‘Uhila Liava‘a, and Uiliami 
Fukofuka were returned as People’s 
Representatives in Tongatapu, ‘Uliti 
Uata and Teisina Fuko in Ha‘apai, and 
Samiu Vaipulu and Masao Paasi in 
Vava‘u. Tui‘pulotu Lauaki became
the member for ‘Eua, and ‘Ofa 
Fusitu‘a, the only woman among the 
members, was returned for the Niuas, 
the group of small outlying islands in 
the northernmost part of the Tongan 
archipelago.
The 1993–96 parliamentary term 
was marked by vigorous and often 
stormy debate. Fist fights broke out in 
the House, a People’s Representative 
was suspended for fourteen days for 
throwing a law book at the Speaker, 
and successive motions were tabled by 
the People’s Representatives in an 
unsuccessful attempt to dismiss the 
repressively anti-prodemocratic minis-
ter of police. Outside the House, one 
of the representatives was no less 
aggressive, confrontational, and adver-
sarial, and incurred fines, which 
amounted to many thousands of 
pa‘anga, for his libellous attacks on 
several men of note in the realm.
One significant step forward 
emerged from the tumult: the right for 
the Noble’s and People’s Representa-
tives to present private and public bills 
in the House. Until 1994, only cabinet 
ministers could present bills for consid-
eration by the Tongan Parliament. 
Moves to allow the representatives to 
do so had been under way for years, 
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pushed it through. The sheer weight of 
numbers ranged against the People’s 
Representatives, however, makes it 
unlikely that any of their more “radi-
cal” bills will be approved. Instead, the 
right to present bills has provided the 
more moderate representatives with 
the rationale to withdraw even further 
from what they see as their parliamen-
tary colleagues’ excesses.
Paasi distanced himself from a radi-
cal prodemocracy position straight 
after his election in 1993, and recently 
restated his position. “I believe in 
working through the House, amending 
laws and the Constitution . . . we do 
not have to rally people and to create a 
situation where we have to confront 
government, and demand change or 
else—the outcome of such an approach 
would be bloodshed, and I don’t
want that to happen” (MT, Oct–Nov 
1995, 15).
‘Uhila Liava‘a, a former accountant 
general, also feels that political change 
demands more intelligent, concerted 
action in the House by the People’s 
Representatives. In 1993, his first year 
of office, his own technical expertise 
was displayed during the presentation 
of the country’s annual financial 
report, when his acute critique led to 
the minister’s withdrawal and redraft-
ing of the report. He found, however, 
that he could not work with a number 
of his colleagues and, like Paasi, 
clashed repeatedly with Pohiva. In 
August 1994, the five Tongatapu and 
Ha‘apai representatives formed the 
People’s Party, Tonga’s first political 
party, to enable them to present a more 
united front in the pursuit of prode-
mocracy issues. The differences between them soon became so great, 
however, that major divisions 
appeared within their ranks. These led 
not only to the collapse of the party 
but also to any hope that the five 
might stand together on a single ticket 
for the elections. The chairman of the 
People’s Party was ‘Uliti Uata, the 
president was Uiliami Fukofuka, the 
vice-president was ‘Akilisi Pohiva, the 
secretary was ‘Uhila Liava‘a, and the 
treasurer was Teisina Fuko. In the first 
quarter of 1995, Liava‘a left the party 
because of its failure to censure 
Pohiva’s actions and over their per-
sonal and political differences. “We 
have to cultivate a spirit of co-opera-
tion in the House . . . and demonstrate 
what we can do,” he said. “It is diffi-
cult talking to them [the People’s 
Party] because they do not have any-
thing else to offer, beside talking about 
taking power off the King” (MT, Oct–
Nov 1995, 16).
Uata, Fuko, and Pohiva have spo-
ken of the possibility of the violent 
wresting of power from the king and 
his government, although Fukofuka 
has always remained moderate. His 
sweet reasonableness earned his disfa-
vor with Pohiva, however, and also 
with Futa Helu, a leading Tongan 
scholar and advocate of democracy, 
who provides much of the intellectual 
force behind the prodemocracy move-
ment.
The campaigning for the 1996 elec-
tions was subdued compared with the 
run-up to the 1993 elections. Fuko-
fuka withdrew from the prodemocracy 
movement’s decision to mount nomi-
nations for candidates and, finally, 
stood as an independent. He has 
always opposed the prodemocracy 
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He believes that the movement should 
confine its activities to the political 
education of the electorate. He said, 
“The public have grasped the funda-
mentals of democracy, which is major-
ity rule, but they have no concept of 
how it can be applied to the formation 
of a government, and that there is, for 
instance, Liberal Democracy and 
Christian Democracy” (MT, Jan–Mar 
1996, 26). The last distinction masks 
the deep divide between atheist intel-
lectuals in the movement, who think 
democracy is an end that will justify 
radical means, including, if necessary, 
the sacrifice of family life, and civil dis-
obedience or violence; and others, who 
revere the more traditional Tongan 
values respecting the family and the 
church, even as they continue to strive 
for lawful political reforms.
Among the former is Professor Futa 
Helu, director of the ‘Atenisi Institute. 
Given the intransigence of the Prode-
mocracy Movement Committee, which 
decided not to mount a team of prode-
mocracy candidates after Fukofuka’s 
withdrawal, Helu proceeded to 
announce his own. His political cam-
paign was the most active and best 
organized of all. He used the ‘Atenisi 
Ex-Students Association to hold kava 
parties in the villages and also used to 
good effect radio and Taimi ‘o Tonga 
newspaper publicity. He was not as 
successful as he had been in former 
elections because, he claimed, “too 
many candidates went on the Pro-
Democracy Movement tickets. They 
just labelled themselves as Pro-Democ-
racy, but they are not active in the Pro-
Democracy Movement” (MT, Jan–Mar 
1996, 26). Only three of his nominees were elected: Pohiva in Tongatapu, and 
Fuko and Uata in Ha‘apai. Pohiva 
later commented, “Because there was a 
split among us, we could not unite in 
this election, we all went in as individ-
uals and that’s terrible. . . . we can’t 
afford to let the people see us as indi-
viduals who are trying to work 
together and fail to unite” (MT, Jan–
Mar 1996, 26).
In Tongatapu, Fukofuka succeeded 
on his own, but Liava‘a lost his seat to 
a surprise candidate, a former minister 
of finance and a longtime resident of 
Auckland, Mahe‘Uli‘Uli Tupouniua. 
The only woman member, ‘Ofa 
Fusitu‘a, failed to gain reelection for 
the Niuas and was replaced by ‘Aisea 
Ta‘ofi. Local issues, particularly rivalry 
between Nuiafo‘ou and Niuatoputapu, 
rather than wider political consider-
ations, were probably the decisive fac-
tors in her defeat. The strongest 
feature of the election was the over-
whelming support shown for ‘Akilisi 
Pohiva who again gained over 64 per-
cent of the votes in his electorate, this 
time polling a massive 9145 votes. In 
its March issue, a local newspaper, Ko 
e ‘Ofa ki Tonga, published by the 
Tokaikolo Church Fellowship, pre-
sented the results of a small survey it 
had conducted after the elections. It 
showed that personal knowledge of 
the candidates still plays an important 
role in their political support: “rela-
tives and friends/acquaintances” 
accounted for almost 60 percent of the 
vote for Fuko and over 30 percent for 
Vaipulu. In Paasi’s and Uata’s cases, 
the factor of personal relationships 
accounted for around 15 to 16 percent 
of their votes. It accounted for 12 per-
cent of Fukofuka’s vote but only 6 per-
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percent of Pohiva’s.
The old-style politics has not quite 
disappeared: over 71 percent of Uata’s 
supporters said they voted for him 
because they find his boats useful (he 
runs a small fleet of interisland cargo 
vessels). His work for democracy and 
his experience in parliament accounted 
for almost another 13 percent of his 
support. The last two factors together 
accounted for almost 38 percent, how-
ever, of his running mate, Fuko’s, vote. 
Paasi, who is Tonga’s most experienced 
parliamentarian, having first entered 
the House in 1966 at the age of 29, 
acquired over 70 percent of his votes 
because of his parliamentary experi-
ence. Vaipulu gained over 48 percent 
of his vote from a combination of his 
work for change and his experience in 
parliament, but gained almost another 
15 percent of his support from the 
votes cast by the members of one 
church in which he and his family are 
active.
Fukofuka gained almost 50 percent 
of his vote because he is a Christian 
and supports Christian Democracy, a 
movement he began late in 1995. He 
gained a further 30 percent because of 
his good parliamentary record. Mahe 
Tupouniua gathered almost 50 per-
cent of his support from the fact that 
he is already experienced in the minis-
terial role, although it is now so long 
ago that only middle-aged people 
would be likely to remember it or 
recall accurately the government cir-
cumstances in which it was carried 
out. He gained another 31 percent 
because he is a “sensible candidate,” a 
moderate man who conducts himself 
well. He gained 12 percent because he is believed to be working for gentle or 
gradual change. The man who ran 
away with the votes, however, with a 
margin of over 4500 votes from Tup-
ouniua, his nearest rival, was ‘Akilisi 
Pohiva. Five percent of his supporters 
found him moving or inspirational, 
and to be at the heart of change. Over 
83 percent declared, more emphati-
cally, that they voted for him because 
he “talks straight and is honest” (‘Ofa 
ki Tonga 11 [March 1996]: 5,16).
Over 60 candidates, including five 
women, contested the nine people’s 
seats, showing the growth of interest in 
politics. Some, the people had never 
heard of; others had professional qual-
ifications, were retired civil servants, 
prominent businessmen, or agricul-
tural growers. None of them came 
near ‘Akilisi Pohiva. Vaipulu, who 
moved to the number one position 
from the number two position in 
Vava‘u, summed up the general feeling, 
“I don’t think the Tongatapu people 
voted for ‘Akilisi Pohiva because he 
was labelled as a Pro-Democracy can-
didate, rather it was because ‘Akilisi 
captured their attention with the work 
he is doing” (MT, Jan–Mar 1996, 26). 
This view is shared by other keen 
observers of the election (compare 
Campbell 1996). People in villages dis-
like what they hear about corruption 
among officials and the unfair advan-
tages granted to an already prosperous 
elite, but they are powerless to redress 
the issues and are reluctant to express 
their views for fear of the repercus-
sions and retribution that can come 
swiftly and sharply from those in 
power. To them, Pohiva is a champion 
of the underdogs’ rights. They do not 
understand or, in most cases, care 
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democracy, but they understand that 
Pohiva will take on the most powerful 
men in the land on behalf of the com-
mon people.
The People’s Representatives for the 
current three-year term are Pohiva, 
Uata, and Fuko, who believe that the 
king should relinquish his power but 
remain as a figurehead. They want the 
people to elect all the members of par-
liament, including nobles, from whom 
the king could appoint his ministers. 
They believe that by mobilizing public 
support at the village level they can 
force the government to make major 
changes. Fukofuka might believe this 
too, but his approach is more moder-
ate; so is Tupouniua’s, although he is 
as yet untried. Lauaki and Ta‘ofi see 
themselves as independents who sup-
port change according to their own 
lights. Paasi and Vaipulu from Vava‘u 
would wish to let the king’s appoint-
ment of his ministers stand; they 
emphasize that political changes can be 
negotiated in the House if the People’s 
Representatives are sufficiently capable 
and can convince the nobles and gov-
ernment that the laws and constitution 
should be amended in line with pro-
gressive social and economic trends 
(MT, Jan–Mar 1996, 24).
Apart from the three who believe 
that public pressure can force the gov-
ernment’s hand, the others all seem to 
accept that, given the structure of the 
House, no change can take place with-
out the assent of the powerful major-
ity. Also, there are certain face-saving 
exercises to be considered. Tonga has a 
powerful and paternalistic govern-
ment and monarch who are very con-
scious of their dignity. In the greater interests of reform and of the nation at 
large, it would be unwise to make 
either of them look as if their hands 
were being forced into change. Indeed, 
as the king has his government in place 
with all the sanction of law, it is hard 
to see how their mighty hands could be 
forced. Widespread civil strife is a des-
perate option, and unlikely to occur.
One surprise during the election 
campaign was the sudden appointment 
as minister of police of one of the can-
didates, Clive Edwards, obe, a lawyer 
who has lived for many years in Auck-
land. This followed immediately on the 
death of the previous minister, the 
Honourable ‘Akau‘ola, after a long ill-
ness. Edwards, who spoke about 
reform in his election campaign, was 
not long in making his conservative 
presence felt. The police have been told 
to smarten up, people in possession of 
firearms have been brought in for 
questioning, and, more particularly, he 
has come down hard on illegal immi-
grants in what he maintains is the 
enforcement of the existing Immigra-
tion Act.
By May 1996, about fifty people 
had been ordered to leave the country. 
Most of them were Indians, with one 
or two Chinese, who were illegally 
running businesses in Tonga while on 
visitors’ permits. Edwards is also tar-
geting people who have permits but 
whom he thinks should not be there. 
The future status of over 51 percent of 
the Tongatapu small business commu-
nity is in question, and up to a thou-
sand foreign residents may be told to 
leave. Much of his reasoning seems no 
more than schoolboy retaliation for 
the way New Zealand and other 
Pacific rim governments have cracked 
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recent decisions may be overturned in 
parliamentary debate in the new Legis-
lative Assembly, which commenced on 
28 May 1996. His actions have drawn 
attention, however, to anomalies in the 
Immigration Act and the need to estab-
lish clear policy guidelines and create 
new visa categories.
The decisions also have repercus-
sions for the future of foreign invest-
ment in Tonga. The actions of the 
police minister, coupled with a curious 
statement from the Ministry of 
Labour, Commerce and Industries list-
ing the ventures that foreigners may 
not invest in, has led to puzzlement, 
anger, and unease among the business 
community. The Tonga Chamber of 
Commerce has appealed to the govern-
ment to consider carefully its position 
with regard to the foreign business 
people established in Tonga, many of 
whom have invested a great deal of 
effort and money in their ventures.
Edwards has also closely monitored 
the activities of the prodemocracy 
group and given suspended sentences 
to two prodemocracy supporters who 
wrote highly defamatory letters about 
him to the Taimi ‘o Tonga. In particu-
lar, he warned Pohiva and two others 
before they traveled to Vava‘u to pro-
mote the movement that they were not 
to make criminal statements about the 
corruption of ministers or create anger 
and hatred against the government and 
the king as these were both expressly 
prohibited by section 48 of the Crimi-
nal Offences Act (MT, Apr–Jun 1996, 
13). Pohiva claimed that Edwards was 
effectively muzzling the movement but 
the minister denied this, and added, “I 
believe there is a need for some changes in government, to improve the 
electoral right of the people and I still 
believe in that. But we should go 
through parliament and get the King
to agree to changes” (MT, Apr–Jun 
1996, 12).
According to its acting chairman, 
the Reverend Simote Vea, the pro-
democracy committee is planning a 
march to the palace later in the year to 
present a petition requesting that the 
king make “major political changes” 
(MT, Apr–Jun 1996, 13). Vea denied 
allegations that the visits to Vava‘u 
(and Ha‘apai) were to encourage peo-
ple to reject the present form of gov-
ernment and said they were part of a 
long-planned education program to 
explain the benefits of having the king 
appoint cabinet ministers from elected 
members of the House. The Awareness 
and Education Programme run by the 
prodemocracy committee is funded 
largely by overseas organizations, 
including Bread for the World, which 
collects money through Christian 
churches in Germany. Vea said the pro-
democracy committee is trying to for-
malize its operation with guidelines 
and a constitution. Although its main 
function should be education and not 
political campaigns, he sees the even-
tual formation, in perhaps three to five 
years, of a political wing. It seems clear 
that some changes will take place in 
the Tongan system of government, 
beginning, perhaps, over the current 
parliamentary term.
It seems equally clear, however, 
from the numbers of moderate inde-
pendents among the People’s Represen-
tatives and the statements of the new 
minister for police, who is rumored to 
be planning a committee to consider 
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be establishment-guided and will have 
to be establishment-approved.
kerry james
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Western Samoa
Western Samoa experienced a tumultu-
ous year that saw the birth of a new 
political party and the merger of two 
others, legal challenges by the govern-
ment’s former controller and chief 
auditor and an anti-tax group, and an 
emergency hospital visit by the nation’s 
top politician. Dengue fever and 
destructive African snails put in sud-
den and unwelcome appearances. 
Women’s issues, particularly spousal 
abuse, were also debated, and the inde-
pendent media took aim at the govern-
ment for ignoring poverty and the 
explosion of child labor in Apia. The 
media also found themselves criticized 
by the government for being too criti-
cal of government activities. All of this 
was capped off by a highly contentious 
national election that saw the govern-
ing party returned for a further five 
years.
The Value Added Goods and Ser-
vices Tax, which adds 10 percent to all purchases (inaugurated at the begin-
ning of 1995), topped the list of con-
troversial measures introduced by the 
government. Prime Minster Tofilau Eti 
Alesana and his party, the Human 
Rights Protection Party (hrpp), main-
tain that the public sector requires a 
source of revenue in order to provide 
services and undertake public projects. 
Opponents, including Opposition 
Leader Tui Atua Tupua Tamasese of 
the Samoa National Development 
Party (sndp), and Matatumua Maimo-
aga, the founder of the newest political 
party, the Samoa All People’s Party 
(sapp), angrily denounced the measure 
saying it imposes too onerous a burden 
on the poorest Samoans. While deny-
ing they are a political party, Tumua 
and Pule, an opposition group, took to 
the streets to demonstrate against the 
value-added tax in early 1994. They 
subsequently attempted to deliver a 
petition allegedly signed by 133,000 
citizens to the head of state but were 
rebuffed by the government. A four-
teen-member government-appointed 
commission of inquiry later dismissed 
the petition as a fabrication, because 
they could only verify eleven of the 
signatures. Two of Tumua and Pule’s 
leaders, Faamatuani Tala Mailei and 
Toleapaialii Toesulusulu, had sedition 
charges brought against them by the 
government, but these were dismissed 
in June 1995. They planned to 
counter-sue the government, claiming 
obstruction of their constitutional 
rights to free speech and freedom of 
assembly. Court action on their suit is 
still pending at the time of writing.
The Samoan business community, 
which pledged to support implementa-
tion of the value-added tax, has also 
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In September 1995, spokesmen for the 
Manufacturers Association and the 
Chamber of Commerce said that they 
had an understanding with the govern-
ment that, in exchange for their sup-
port on the tax, the government would 
review current income tax and tariff 
charges. Local businessmen expected 
there would be a reduction in the duty 
on raw materials, a more rational, less 
complicated system of duty calcula-
tion, and a lowering of income taxes. 
Following the government review, 
however, the only indication of 
progress in this direction is a stated 
commitment to tax reform in the min-
ister of finance’s 1995–96 budget.
In February, the government 
announced a reduction in duties on 
several imported items. The opposition 
characterized the move as a means of 
soliciting votes in the upcoming elec-
tions. This was vehemently denied by 
Deputy Prime Minister Tuilaepa Sailele 
Malielegaoi, who said the reductions 
were part of a long-term government 
program. The government refused to 
lower tariffs on newsprint despite 
opposition demands, in an apparent 
slap at a private newspaper, The 
Samoa Observer, which had been con-
tinually critical of the government.
Apia was the venue for the Eighth 
South Pacific Regional Environmental 
Programme meeting held in early 
October 1995. French representatives 
found themselves the object of angry 
protests against the resumption of 
nuclear testing in French Polynesia 
earlier in the year. Many of the protest-
ers questioned the sincerity of French 
claims that they were concerned about 
the environment when they were simultaneously testing nuclear 
weapons in the region. Many also 
found it odd that France should be 
invited when they had been virtually 
ignored at the South Pacific Forum 
dialogue meeting just a month before. 
Western Samoa joined with six other 
South Pacific nations at the meeting to 
issue a strongly worded protest that 
asked for an immediate end to the test 
series until a comprehensive environ-
mental assessment could be carried out 
at the two test sites, Moruroa and Fan-
gataufa. France’s permanent secretary 
for the South Pacific, Jean Bressot, 
who was at the meeting, indicated the 
series would end in a few months and 
the test sites would be closed down. 
After conducting a total of six tests in 
the latter half of 1995, French Presi-
dent Jacques Chirac finally announced 
an end to the test series in late January 
1996.
The government of Western Samoa 
found itself the object of regional ridi-
cule in December 1995 when the news-
magazine Islands Business named 
suspended Controller and Chief Audi-
tor Su‘a Rimoni Ah Chong its Pacific 
Man of the Year. Su‘a was suspended 
by the government in June 1995 for 
issuing a report detailing widespread 
misuse of public office and money 
among Samoan politicians. He was 
suspended from office before the 
report was made public and action 
could be taken against those abusing 
the public trust. Although he has pop-
ular support, it is reportedly muted 
because of a “year of repercussions, 
both business and personal.”
Su‘a’s fortunes did not improve in 
January 1996 when the Supreme Court 
cleared the prime minister, his govern-
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a lawsuit charging wrongful conduct 
brought by Su‘a. In early March, a 
motion to suspend him from his posi-
tion a second time (the first suspension 
had lapsed) was enacted by the hrpp-
dominated parliament by a vote of 34 
to 10. The prime minister told parlia-
ment he would resign if his motion 
failed. At the same time, he accused 
Su‘a of misappropriating government 
funds to mount his legal case against 
the government. Su‘a has responded 
with a series of lawsuits, the latest of 
which was lodged against the prime 
minister for the personal attack he 
made in parliament.
Su‘a did receive some measure of 
support later when the Western Samoa 
Society for Civil Liberties claimed in a 
widely circulated letter that Deputy 
Prime Minister Tuilaepa Sailele Maliel-
egaoi should get the full blame for pre-
venting government accounts from 
1990–1993 from being audited by the 
controller and chief auditor. According 
to the society, this clearly contravened 
the provisions of the 1964 Public 
Money Act. The letter argued that the 
rights of citizens and taxpayers had 
been “seriously abridged or under-
mined” because of government refusal 
to audit public accounts. The deputy 
prime minister was reelected in the 
April 1996 elections and retained his 
ministerial posts.
One recurring debate in Samoa is 
whether poverty exists or not. Hrpp 
members claimed in parliament that it 
did not exist in the country if one 
“compared [local] conditions to places 
like Bombay or Calcutta or Samoa of 
the 1920s.” Sndp members were quick 
to point out that neither city nor a Samoa of sixty years ago provided an 
accurate yardstick to measure poverty 
by. They suggested that hrpp members 
were ignorant of the poverty surround-
ing them and had done little to allevi-
ate the conditions of the poor. An 
independent survey by a New Zealand 
firm, Social Policy 2000, subsequently 
confirmed poverty existed in the coun-
try. The study focused special attention 
on the plight of children aged ten to 
twelve selling products in Apia when 
they should be in school. At the same 
time the Samoa Observer, a local inde-
pendent paper, ran a series of pictures 
documenting child labor and denounc-
ing the government for its inaction. 
While the Social Policy 2000 group did 
receive criticism for its supposedly 
unscientific collection of data and its 
conclusions, no effort has been made 
to date to rectify the problem of child 
labor and ensure that all children have 
access to a proper education.
Women’s issues commanded atten-
tion several times during the year, most 
notably as a result of the actions of 
politicians. Minister of Women’s 
Affairs Polataivao Fosi reportedly 
swore at a female supervisor of the 
Western Samoa Shipping Corporation, 
when there was no room for his vehicle 
on the ferry to Savai‘i. Then Member 
Tofilau Tauvagaa raised eyebrows in 
February 1996 when he complained in 
parliament that too many Samoan 
women “were spending their time yap-
yapping at women’s committees and 
coming home late instead of caring for 
their families.” Finally, a women’s 
group, Mapusaga o Aiga, met formally 
to discuss the issue of spousal abuse at 
a week-long conference in February 
1996. They discussed a report contain-
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accounts of rape and severe beatings 
suffered by various Samoan wives.
Several controversial government 
sell-offs occurred during the year. In 
October, the government sold its 25 
percent interest in the Bank of Western 
Samoa to the Australia and New 
Zealand Banking group, which now 
has 100 percent ownership of the 
bank. A government spokesperson 
explained that it was “part of the gov-
ernment’s continuing Programme to 
privatize its shareholding,” but several 
financial observers were surprised by 
the sudden government divestiture of a 
profitable company. They speculated 
that the sell-off was necessary to “plug 
a budget blow-out” that includes pay-
ing off the government-owned Polyne-
sian Airlines debt estimated to be in 
the range of ws$70–90 million. Similar 
plans were afoot for the divestiture of 
the government shares of Western 
Samoa Breweries, another profitable 
company, in December. The govern-
ment has also drawn on the country’s 
foreign reserves, cut into public expen-
diture, and borrowed from the 
National Provident Fund to finance 
the airline debt.
Medical issues were of major con-
cern to Samoan politicians and citizens 
during 1995–96. In the fall of 1995, 
Samoa experienced an outbreak of 
dengue fever, which resulted in some 
deaths. Many others fell ill, and health 
facilities were overrun. Complicating 
the situation was the initial inability of 
the Health Department to positively 
identify the illness and an effective 
means of treating it. Tests run in New 
Zealand finally confirmed in late 
December 1995 that the illness wasa new strain of dengue fever, but this 
was not announced until well after the 
illness had run its course.
Aids continued to worry many 
Samoans. A study conducted in early 
1996 showed that many young 
Samoan adults remain ignorant of the 
causes and treatment of aids. Accord-
ing to the April 1996 edition of the 
journal, Talamua, one case of death 
resulting from aids-related diseases 
was reported in June 1995, and a sec-
ond individual, a woman, is reportedly 
close to death. Health officials indi-
cated that they were awaiting the 
results of blood tests for a Samoan 
rugby player believed to have had rela-
tions with the dying woman. The gov-
ernment is looking at various options 
that would give the Health Depart-
ment the legal power to test those 
suspected of carrying the aids virus.
Relations with other countries 
remained unchanged, save Samoa’s 
relations with France. Given the end of 
the nuclear testing in the South Pacific 
at the start of 1996, however, rapid 
improvement in the relationship seems 
likely. In other news, Japan has begun 
another large aid project in Samoa, the 
construction of the new National Uni-
versity of Samoa. The People’s Repub-
lic of China will soon complete its 
construction project, the Women and 
Youth’s Economic Activity Centre, 
which will serve as a major venue for 
the celebration of the upcoming Sev-
enth Pacific Festival of Arts to be held 
in September.
The taro blight, which began effec-
tively destroying Samoa’s leading 
export crop in mid-1993, continues 
unabated into its third year. In May 
1996, former Minister of Agriculture 
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might have been the result of economic 
sabotage. Telefoni said the blight had 
not only diminished Samoa’s export 
earnings, but also resulted in a marked 
increase in rice imports, further 
aggravating Samoa’s already serious 
negative balance of trade. Local busi-
nessmen were skeptical of Telefoni’s 
claims, citing the lack of supervision at 
ports of entry as the most likely cul-
prit. Producing taro in Samoa is still 
feasible, but the recommended chemi-
cal treatment is expensive and the 
labor is both intensive and time-con-
suming. Thus, a rebound for Samoa in 
this particular export crop does not 
seem likely in the near future.
Samoa is facing a potentially more 
destructive agricultural problem this 
year. African snails, introduced in 
1991, have suddenly exploded in num-
bers, and efforts by the Agriculture 
Department have failed to stem the 
infestation. The same snail has plagued 
American Samoa since the 1940s. In 
January, the government revealed a 
plan to pay citizens for collecting and 
destroying the snails.
Prime Minister Tofilau Eti Alesana 
had a rocky political year. In October, 
he was embroiled in a land dispute pit-
ting the government against its citi-
zens. Vaiusu village claimed three 
hundred acres of land at Tuana‘imoto, 
which they said had been taken by 
force from them during the German 
colonial occupation of Samoa. How-
ever, the land, which has been adminis-
tered by the Western Samoa Trust 
Estate Corporation since 1962 when 
Samoa became an independent state, is 
considered government property. Vil-
lagers have sought the land’s return since 1991, and recently began divid-
ing up and illegally settling on the land 
in question. The prime minister ducked 
the issue by stating that he would need 
to meet with the government’s Land 
Board before making a final decision. 
At the time of writing, no decision had 
been announced.
In November 1995, the prime min-
ister lashed out against Samoa’s media 
while on a visit to New Zealand, 
claiming that all were politically moti-
vated. The charge was ironic given that 
the government controls most of the 
Samoan media, the only exceptions 
being the Samoa Observer and Magik 
FM 98, a local radio station. In the 
same interview, Alesana also stated the 
need for stricter government control of 
the media. In February, he again 
blasted the media, but was more selec-
tive about his targets. This time he 
blamed the Samoa Observer and 
Magik FM 98 for “being lackeys of the 
opposition.”
In March 1996, Prime Minister Ale-
sana was admitted to the intensive care 
unit of Green Lane Hospital in Auck-
land, where he has been a regular 
patient since undergoing a heart 
bypass operation some years ago. His 
two-week hospital stay, just prior to 
the election, raised once again the issue 
of whether his health was adequate for 
another five-year term of office. The 
issue became moot, however, when he 
returned to campaign for reelection.
The campaign effort was capped by 
a marathon five-hour televised speech 
in mid-April 1996 extolling hrpp 
achievements, and announcing the 
party’s manifesto and promises for the 
coming five-year term. Later the same 
month, the prime minister claimed in 
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plotted to assassinate him during a 
Tumua and Pule political rally a couple 
of years earlier. The assassination 
conspiracy claims, which supposedly 
involved members of the sndp and
the recently suspended government 
controller and chief auditor, were
met with laughter from the oppo-
sition.
A lot of maneuvering by opposition 
parties and political candidates pre-
ceded the election. The Human Rights 
Protection Party lost one of its own 
when Matatumua Maimoaga resigned 
her seat in early March 1996 in order 
to lead a new party, the Samoa All Peo-
ple’s Party. Matatumua has been 
known to vote against her own party 
on what she considered matters of 
principle. She was, for example, the 
only hrpp member to vote against the 
suspension of the controller and chief 
auditor. Matatumua cited government 
corruption and the poor quality of 
education in the country as the moti-
vating factors in her decision to create 
a new party, which she promised 
would be people oriented. The party 
platform did not call for the abolition 
of the value-added tax, although taxes 
on basic necessities would be immedi-
ately removed. Matatumua Maimo-
aga was not reelected in the April 
elections.
At roughly same time, another 
opposition party, the Samoa Liberal 
Party, announced that it would merge 
with the Samoa National Development 
Party. Aiono Nonumalo Leulumoega 
Sofara, founder and leader of the 
Samoa Labour Party since 1993, 
explained that the two parties had 
taken similar positions on issues and that “it was only natural that the two 
parties would come together.” He was 
not reelected in April.
Meanwhile, the main opposition 
party, the Samoa National Develop-
ment Party, stated that it would set up 
an anti-corruption panel if it were 
elected. The tribunal would investigate 
corrupt government practices, process 
complaints of unethical practices by 
politicians and government employ-
ees, and develop a code of conduct and 
ethics for government departments and 
heads. The party also called for abol-
ishing the value-added tax and institut-
ing a transparent and accountable 
financial management system in gov-
ernment, and committed itself to a free 
press.
The national elections were held on 
26 April, and preliminary results indi-
cated that the ruling Human Rights 
Protection Party had lost its absolute 
majority of 34 seats. The opposition 
parties, Samoa National Development 
Party, Samoa Liberal Party, and Samoa 
All Peoples Party, did not capitalize on 
this turn of events, however, as voters 
turned out in large numbers to elect 
independent candidates. Initial results 
showed the Human Rights Protection 
Party with 23 seats; the rival sndp-slp 
with 12 seats; the sapp with 0 and 
independents totaling 13. Prime Minis-
ter Tofilau Eti Alesana boldly claimed 
victory that same evening, insisting 
several independents had joined the 
Human Rights Protection Party. Politi-
cal observers believed that even if that 
were the case, the party’s hold on 
power would be tenuous because of its 
dependence on the support of indepen-
dents in parliament.
The election results did not become 
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ceedings were carried out in the two 
weeks afterward. Official results were 
finally announced on 15 May with the 
hrpp receiving 24 seats, sndp receiving 
11, slp 1, and independents 13. The 
hrpp was then able to convince 
enough independents to join its ranks 
to regain a majority (34 seats) and 
form a government. Prime Minister-elect Tofilau Eti Alesana and his newly 
realigned cabinet were then sworn into 
office on 19 May by His Highness the 
Head of State Malietoa Tanumafili II. 
In a speech prior to being sworn in, 
Tofilau promised that his government 
would work to improve the nation’s 
education system, health system, and 
roads.
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